KOREANS IN JAPAN:
THEIR INFLUENCE ON KOREAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS

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THESIS

KOREANS IN JAPAN:
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by

Alice K. Lee

September 1979

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After World War II, of the 2.5 million Koreans in Japan, the majority were repatriated to their homeland, leaving approximately 600,000 Korean residents.

The Koreans in Japan are divided factionally, each group separately favoring either South or North Korea. This, in turn, creates political differences and animosities.

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From the sociological aspect, a degree of assimilation has taken place among Korean youths, but it remains to be seen whether such assimilation is desirable.

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by

Alice K. Lee
B.A., San Jose State University, 1971

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INTRODUCTION

The population of Korean residents in Japan was very small for several years after the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. It included many students who were receptive to the liberal ideas of the Western world being especially inclined to study the philosop y and industrial techniques of Western civilization. Korea did not have enough colleges and high schools and many young Koreans who could afford it traveled to Japan to continue their education, since Tokyo was looked upon as the intellectual center of East Asia. These students later became the leaders of the Korean Independence Movement in Japan.

In the latter part of World War I, and during the 1920's, the first group of Korean laborers went to Japan. Japanese purchases of Korean farmland had driven Korean farmers to near-starvation. Indeed, harsh economic conditions had forced many Koreans to emigrate to Japan during this period. Another group of laborers was drafted during World War II to fill Japan's acute labor shortages; most laborers worked in the coal mines and lived under miserable conditions. Nearly 30 percent of the coal miners in Japan were Koreans.

When Japan surrendered after World War II there were about 2.5 million Koreans in Japan, and half of them (with their families) had been forcibly drafted as laborers. By 1948, with the cooperation of the Japanese government, the Occupation authorities repatriated over one million Koreans.

Since Korean-Japanese feelings had been hostile even before World War II, after the war Korean residents found themselves in the role of scapegoats for the dissatisfactions expressed by the Japanese population. Because of the hostility between the two groups during the war, Koreans in Japan found themselves discriminated against socially and occupationally with few exceptions.

The Korean groups in Japan are divided factionally, each favoring either North Korea or South Korea. The Koreans in Japan, however, staunchly maintain their national identity, keeping themselves socially apart, speaking Korean, forming their organizations and sending their children to Korean schools. They remain demonstrably unassimilated, cohesive, and loyal to the idea of a unified homeland.

After fourteen years of negotiations, a South Korea-Japan treaty was concluded in 1965 to normalize relations. It was clear that this treaty would have tremendous effects on Koreans in Japan, legally and socially. It would create a new environment in which Koreans would struggle to improve their livelihood and to develop and maintain ties to their respective homelands.

This study will make a useful contribution if it succeeds in highlighting the problems encountered by Koreans in Japan, because the peaceful solution of those problems is essential to the continuing peace and stability of Northeast Asia.

Chapter I analyzes the historical events beginning with the first migration of Koreans to Japan, showing the number of emigrants, their places of origin, their occupations, interest groups, and affiliation with Japanese organizations, their

impact on Japanese society, and the cultural influence felt by Koreans in Japan.

Chapter II deals with the legal position of Koreans in Japan, the treaty on basic relations, the legal status and treatment of Koreans in Japan, Japan's organization for dealing with Koreans, and laws and administrative measures regulating the conduct of Koreans.

Chapter III examines the political and economic position of Koreans in Japan after the South Korean-Japan Treaty of 1965, comparing the revenue and taxes of the Japanese with the Korean residents, and the occupations held by Koreans after the treaty.

Chapter IV deals with the Korean ties with their homeland; with the North or the South; analyzing their influence on Korean policies.

Chapter V analyzes the Korean residents' contributions to Korean economy, and discusses Japanese investments in South or North Korea.

Chapter VI presents the summary and concluding observations. The hypothesis is that the socioeconomic condition of the Korean residents in Japan has not improved materially through the years. Despite recent progress, Korean residents still suffer from informal sanctions within the Japanese economy. The possibility of increasing legal, economical, and social assimilation, however, holds a brighter promise for future generations.

I. KOREAN EMIGRATION

A. THE PERIOD OF JAPANESE OCCUPATION

According to the Nihol Teikoku Tokei Nenkan (A Statistical Yearbook of the Japanese Empire), which was compiled by the Bureau of Vital Statistics, Home Ministry of Japan in 1885, there was only one Korean resident in Japan. By 1909, the year before the Japanese annexation of Korea, there were 126,168 Japanese living in Korea but only 790 Koreans living in Japan.[1] The major emigration of Koreans to Japan began around 1910.

Most Koreans emigrated to Japan from Pusan, the southern seaport in Korea, although no official census exists which would give exact numbers. In Japan, obtaining information on immigration was comparatively easy. A census was taken in the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's. In addition, the Security Police Bureau of the Home Ministry conducted an independent survey formulating statistical data of these periods in the form of a census. The "Overall Study of Koreans in Japan"[2] was compiled using these two statistical studies of Korean immigrants. This was a detailed analysis of the natural increase and decrease in the Korean population over the period from 1910 to 1945.

The table following indicates the number of Koreans in two separate groups: (1) those who were already in Japan, and (2) those who emigrated in each of the ensuing years.

TABLE I

SURVEY OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN
1910-1945

Year	Residents	Emigrants	Year	Residents	Emigrants
1910-13	3,952	3,952	1931	437,519	12,621
1914	4,176	168	1932	504,176	59,871
1915	5,046	802	1933	573,896	61,995
			1934	639,651	56,472
1916	7,225	2,082	1935	720,818	71,465
1917	17,463	10,003			
1918	27,340	9,507	1936	780,528	49,204
1919	35,995	8,171	1937	822,214	30,619
1920	40,755	4,211	1938	881,347	47,270
			1939	1,030,394	135,177
1921	48,774	7,362	1940	1,241,315	194,213
1922	82,693	32,806			
1923	112,051	27,850	1941	1,469,230	208,139
1924	168,002	53,690	1942	1,625,054	133,951
1925	187,102	16,582	1943	1,768,180	119,326
			1944	1,911,307	117,401
1926	207,853	17,953	1945	2,100,000	160,427
1927	246,515	35,344			
1928	341,737	90,622			
1929	387,901	40,943			
1930	419,009	25,468			

Source: Overall Study of Koreans in Japan, Pak Chae-il, pp. 29-31.

Korean residents in Japan totaled only 3,952 persons in 1913. However, by 1945 the population had increased to 2.1 million. During the thirty-six year occupation of Korea by the Japanese, the number of Korean emigrants to Japan had reached nearly 2 million. It was an astounding phenomenon. It could be explained as the direct result of Japanese colonialist policies. Clearly, the exportation of Koreans as analogous to the exportation of rice, minerals, and other raw materials, which were carried on under the occupational authorities.[3] Most of the

emigrants during this period were laborers who had been forced to leave their homeland.

During the early 1900's but especially after the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, several hundred Korean students went to Japan to study the philosophy and industrial techniques of Western civilization. Korea did not have enough colleges, or even high schools, to satisfy the needs of students hungry for the new knowledge. The Confucian-style schools of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) were suppressed by the Japanese after annexation and the high schools established by the Japanese could not begin to absorb all Korean students who wished to attend.[4] Students were attracted to Japan rather than to other nations because of its proximity to Korea, the similarity of language, and the opportunity to obtain part-time employment.[5] Tokyo had become the intellectual center of East Asia and many young Koreans who could afford it settled there to continue their education.

One of the best known student leaders of the period was Yi Kwang-su, whose radical idealism epitomized the spirit of Korean nationalism among the Korean residents in Japan which, in turn, encouraged some of the Korean nationalist leaders to proclaim the declaration of independence on March 1, 1919, in Seoul.

The Korean laborers' migration to Japan took place over three distinct periods. During the first period, from 1910 to 1925, a great number of Koreans were persuaded and encouraged by the Japanese to go to Japan. The number of emigrants reached 160,000, about 9.2 percent of the total emigrants. From 1910 to

1919, however, the number of emigrants dropped to a mere 30,000. Although many Japanese enterpreneurs visited Korea to recruit badly needed factory workers, there had been only a small number of applicants from the Korean population. However, during the latter half of this period, especially after 1920, this situation changed drastically.[6] Consequently, during 1922-23, approximately 30,000 new emigrants went to Japan, mostly farmers who had lost their farm lands and their livelihood. The Japanese government carried out an extensive land survey between 1910 and 1918 under the theme, "The Modernization of Korean Economy." Although Korean farmers were instructed to register their land within a specified time, since many of them were illiterate, they did not understand the procedure and lost title to their land to either local Korean landlords or to Japanese who, in turn, enriched themselves by filing claims to the lands.[7]

The second period, from 1926 to 1938, was the period during which many Koreans were forced to go to Japan. New emigrants reached 60,000, comprising 32.6 percent of the total. "The Increased Rice Production Plan," begun in 1920 by the Japanese Governor General in Korea was, for all practical purposes, an attempt to control the Korean agrarian economy, thereby placing it under colonial capitalism. Poor harvests, coupled with the drastic lowering of the price of rice by the Japanese, affected the livelihood of many Korean farmers. The farmers often found themselves unable to pay for fertilizer with the money they received from the sale of rice. They were near starvation, and many desired to leave such miserable living conditions to seek a new life in Japan.[8]

> During this period, the following scenes were prevalent through the farm villages in the south. A great number of desolute farmers would come to the village police station hundreds of times, year after year. If they had relatives already living in Japan, they would try everything possible to procure documents to go to Japan. As soon as these documents (so-called the ocean crossing documents) were obtained, they would liquidate whatever little they had possessed to pay for the passage to Japan. With what little remained (usually a very minimal amount of money), they would sail to Japan, en masse. In front of the Marine Police Station in Pusan, a gateway port in Korea, one could see a never ending line of people in white. (White clothing was traditionally worn by the commoners and the farmers.) Mainly, in the densely populated Korean district in the cities in the Kansai region in Japan (Kobe--Osaka), a large number of these poverty-stricken people began to congregate. Many Koreans who drifted out of this over-populated area often sought their lodgings in the streets and in the other outdoor areas, and roamed around like gypsies. These later were to become familiar and typical scenes in the various parts of the Korean communities in Japan.[9]

In 1928, the year of the worst rice harvest in Korea, nearly 90,000 farmers emigrated to Japan. The status of Korean laborers improved somewhat as they had proven themselves valuable to Japanese industry during the Sino-Japanese war.[10]

It was during the third period, from 1939 to 1945, that a larger number of Koreans had been forcibly sent to Japan. Of the 1.23 million Koreans sent during this period, 820,000 had been conscriptees, while the other 41,000 represented new emigrants. However, beginning in 1943, approximately 160,000 Koreans were repatriated, leaving a net 1.06 million people, comprising about 58.2 percent of the total emigrants.[11]

Japan's 1940 census put the number of Koreans in Japan at 1,241,315 and most of them, 96 percent, were attracted by job opportunities available in Japan (see Tables II, III).

TABLE II

KOREAN POPULATION IN JAPAN

Year	On the basis of census reports	On the basis of house-to-house canvasses
1911	---	2,527
1920	40,755	30,175
1930	419,009	298,091
1940	1,241,315	1,190,444

Source: Jeon Joon, "A Study of Chosoren I," p. 19.

TABLE III

REASONS GIVEN FOR MIGRATING TO JAPAN
(Tokyo, 1934)

Reason	Householder	%	Single	%
Schooling	26	1.35	208	11.79
Poverty	716	37.04	464	26.28
Labor	354	18.32	106	6.00
Making Money	774	40.04	735	41.62
Job Opportunity	16	0.83	217	12.29
Other	47	2.42	36	2.02
	1,933	100.00	1,766	100.00

Source: Jeon Joon, "A Study of Chosoren I," p. 19.

The majority of laborers worked in the mines, representing nearly 30 percent of the total coal miners in Japan. They were treated harshly and lived in segregated slums. They often found themselves in the role of scapegoats for the dissatisfactions among the Japanese population, being held responsible for situations with which they had nothing to do.[12] Since the majority of Korean emigrants were illiterate or semi-illiterate (See Table IV), they became easy targets of criticism and ridicule

TABLE IV

EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF THE KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN

(1931)

Ed. Level / Age	Illiterate	Attending Elem. School	High School	Drop Out Elem. School	Graduate Elem. School	High School Grad.	Drop Out Middle School	Grad. Middle School	Total
	74								74
Under 5									
10	39	20		1					60
15	16	19	2	4	1				42
20	9			4	14		1		28
25	24			5	10	1			40
30	25			8	7	1		1	42
35	29			6	10				45
40	22			7	7		1		37
45	11			3	2				16
50	5			1	1				7
55	6								6
60	3								3
65	4								4
70	4								4
75	1								1

Source: Jeon Joon, "A Study of Chosoren, I," p. 74.

by the Japanese. They were labeled unscrupulous, untrustworthy, and base. The Japanese came to regard all Koreans as undesirables. To these illiterate and economically disadvantaged Koreans, with their characteristic attire and manners, the contempt and the discriminatory attitude of the Japanese was an insurmountable problem. Further, the Japanese government contributed the anti-Korean sentiment by distorting and overemphasizing the revolutionary and terrorist activities of the Korean patriots in Japan.[13]

B. AFTER WORLD WAR II

When Japan surrendered after World War II, there were about 2.5 million Koreans in Japan, half of whom had been forcibly drafted as laborers.[14] The Supreme Commadner for the Allied Powers (SCAP) facilitated the repatriation of Japanese in Korea to Japan and of Koreans in Japan to Korea. The number of returnees from Japan to South Korea was 769,146 in March 1946,[15] and increased to 1,030,549 by May 20, 1946.[16] Between August 1945 and August 1947, approximately 1.39 million Koreans left for South Korea.[17] The SCAP directive of September 22, 1945, placed monetary and personal property restrictions upon Korean residents. They were permitted to take home up to 1,000 yen and only what they could carry as personal possessions. The SCAP decreed such restrictive measures to half further deterioration of economic conditions in Japan.[18] As a result, more than 600,000 Koreans remained in Japan.[19] Of these, 300,000 to 400,000 had emigrated to Japan before 1930 and had settled there permanently.[20] Those who chose to remain in Japan eventually forfeited their right to be repatriated.

Those who chose to remain in Japan gave several reasons: (1) they had heard about the difficult economic conditions after the Korean War, (2) there had been a rumor that floods and epidemics ravaged their homeland, and (3) they were resented by the Koreans who had remained at home.[22]

The Korean residents who returned to North Korea, after the repatriation program was resumed in December 1950, consisted of 26,427 families totaling 89,692 persons.[23] The repatriation of Koreans to North Korea was the direct result of Kim Il-sung's attempt to gain a political diplomatic victory over South Korea. In August 1958, Kim Il-sung announced that all Koreans were welcome to return to North Korea from Japan, pleding to pay for the entire repatriation. The repatriation of the Koreans to North Korea, which constituted the first such movement from a democratic society to a communist nation, raised many doubts as to its motivation. However, as a result of the so-called "Homecoming Program" undertaken jointly by the North Korean authorities and Chosoren (Zainichi Chosenjin Sorenkai in Japanese; Chochongnyon in Korea, a pro-North Korea faction in Japan) for Koreans in Japan who had been subjected to unfair treatment and segregation by the Japanese, approximately 100,000 Koreans were shipped to North Korea during the 1959-1975 period. (See Table V.)

Most Koreans who left Japan for North Korea had been listed as very ill, or on welfare in Japan. Pyongyang and Chosoren launched a political campaign under the slogan "repatriation to North Korea" to replenish North Korea's

labor force and acquire equipment and machinery by carrying them away to North Korea as the personal effects of the repatriates. Subsequently, the machines were later sent to construction sites.[25]

TABLE V

REPATRIATION OF KOREANS IN JAPAN TO NORTH KOREA
(December 14, 1959-December 5, 1975)

Category	Year	No. of Shipments	No. of Repatriates
Agreement Period (1st-166th shipment)	1959	3	2,492
	1960	48	49,036
	1961	34	22,801
	1962	16	3,497
	1963	12	2,567
	1964	8	1,822
	1965	11	2,245
	1966	12	1,860
	1967	11	1,841
Temporary Period (6 months: 156th-161st)	(5/14-10-22)	6	1,081
After Temporary Period (162nd-175th) At Own Expense	1971 (12/7)		237
	1972		1,003
	1973		704
	1974		479
	1975		379
Total		175	92,494

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Republic of South Korea.

The repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to North Korea continued in the face of strong protests from the Seoul government. Abuse of the project for espionage and provocative

purposes in collusion with Chosoren touched off controversies.[26] The Japanese government tried to justify its actions on the ground of humanitarian free choice of domicile; however, the repatriation of Koreans to North Korea, to some extent, relieved the pressing problems of providing for these Koreans who had been the recipients of government subsidies. (See Tables VI, VII.)

TABLE VI

PERCENTAGE OF THOSE KOREANS REPATRIATED TO NORTH KOREA WHO HAD BEEN ON WELFARE (December 1961)

Year	%	Year	%
December 1951	41.71	July 1961	25.52
March 1960	39.93	December 1961	25.52
July 1960	29.49	1962 and after	About 10

Source: Japanese Justice Ministry

TABLE VII

OCCUPATION OF MALE ADULTS REPATRIATED TO NORTH KOREA (December 1961)

Occupation	Number	Occupation	Number
Day Laborer	4,528	Restaurant, catering	313
Factory Worker	2,014	Farming, Fishery	619
Driver	855	Student	247
Office worker, Salesman	879	Miscellaneous (including no response)	1,137
Vendor, Regpicker	324		
Merchant, Manufacturer	1,331		
Second-Hand Goods Dealer	877		
		TOTAL	21,773

Source: Japanese Justice Ministry

The initial accord on repatriating Koreans in Japan to North Korea was reached in April 1959 at a conference in Geneva of representatives from the Japanese Red Cross and the North Korean Red Cross, followed by the signing of "Agreements Between the Japanese Red Cross and the North Korean Red Cross on the Repatriation of Koreans in Japan" in Calcutta on August 13.[27] According to the Japanese Red Cross statement on June 26, 1959, approximately 75 percent of the Koreans who were registered to return to North Korea were unemployed in spite of promised employment, education, and decent living conditions in North Korea.[28]

Although the majority of the repatriates originally came from South Korea (See Table XIV), the uncertain economic and political situation in South Korea at that time made it unattractive as a future home.

In complying with their long-standing policy of assimilating or deporting Korean residents in Japan, the Japanese government seemingly obliged the persistent demand of North Korea and Chosoren. In January 1959, Japanese Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama announced that his government would settle the question of repatriating Koreans as soon as possible, in accordance with the international practice of free choice of country. In February, the Japanese cabinet decided to entrust the International Red Cross with the task of confirming the will of prospective repatriates and offering necessary good offices--a development that fully complied with the intention of Chosoren.[29]

On the other hand, Pyongyand had its own reasons for proceeding with repatriation to North Korea. When Chosoren initially proposed repatriation, the Pyongyang government showed little interest except in accepting technicians or scientists required for the economic rehabilitation of North Korea. In June 1958, when the First Five-Year Plan for Development of People's Economy was undertaken, demand for more workers increased suddenly. Loss of many lives during the war depleted North Korea of its labor force; in addition, the imminent withdrawal of Chinese troops, who had been put to work rebuilding the war-torn country, threatened a further drain on manpower.[30]

It was against such a background that the repatriation of Korean residents in Japan was carried out. The repatriation agreement was to expire in 15 months but it was renewed year after year between Japan and North Korea and continues to the present.

In the beginning, Soviet vessels were mobilized to transport the Korean expatriates. As the number of applicants for repatriation decreased, Soviet vessels were replaced by North Korean vessels. From 1960 to 1961, Soviet vessels carried repatraites twice a week, numbering between 2,000 to 5,000 per month. In 1962, however, the number of repatriates dropped to 300 a month; in 1963, it fell to a mere 200 a month.[31] (See Table V.) The reason for the decrease in returnees to North Korea and those who cancelled their application was primarily their realization that their homeland was a far cry from heaven. More and more people came to see

the reality, that food and shelter were not readily available and many repatriates were sent to concentration camps to do hard labor.[32] Among those repatriated to North Korea there were approximately 6,000 Japanese wives. Requests from these Japanese wives of Koreans to return to Japan have not been granted by the North Korean authorities.[33]

As of March 1959, the number of Korean residents in Japan was 613,811 out of the 680,364 permanent alien residents registered by the Japanese government.[34] In 1971, less than 1 percent of the country's residents were of non-Japanese origin; registered foreigners that year were 718,795 of which 622,690 were Koreans, constituting about 87 percent of all foreigners.[35] During subsequent eyars, the number of Korean residents in Japan increased: 629,089 in 1972; 636,346 in 1973; and 642,717 in 1975.[36] (See Tables VIII., IX.)

TABLE VIII

STATUS OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN
(June 30, 1975)

Total Number		Total	642,717
		Male	331,401
		Female	311,316
No. of Households			152,845
Legal Status		Permanent Residents	355,705
		Ordinary Residents	287,012
No. of Registered		Male	169,294
		Female	152,456
		Total	321,750
Classification	Occupation	Agriculture, Forestry	2,032
		Commerce	43,285
		Manufacturing	43,285
		Services	9,694
		Professional	2,961
		Clerical	29,939
		Engineers	5,998
		Skilled Workers	9,037
		Arts, Literary	343
		Religious	1,203
		Students	131,384
		Housewives	132,621
		Others	235,199

Source: Foreign Ministry, "Status of Overseas Koreans."

TABLE IX

DISTRIBUTION OF KOREANS IN JAPAN
(August 1975)

Area	Number	Ratio to All Alien Residents
Osaka	181,543	95.4
Tokyo	73,619	69.6
Hyogo	68,067	83.1
Aichi	54,597	96.1
Kyoto	44,884	95.1
Kanagawa	29,147	70.2
Fukuoka	25,869	92.8
Hiroshima	16,157	93.1
Yamaguchi	14,997	94.5
Gifu	10,987	97.6
Chiba	10,021	83.6
Saitama	9,914	85.9
Okayama	8,479	94.6
Shizuoka	8,385	88.8
Mie	7,988	95.8
Hokkaido	7,127	81.6
Shiga	7,126	96.3
Nara	5,677	91.4
Wakayama	4,990	88.2
Fukui	4,923	96.8
Nagano	4,850	91.1
Ibaragi	3,912	86.9
Niyagi	3,646	80.6
Ishikawa	3,385	93.8
Oita	2,994	87.0
Gumma	2,879	86.6
Niigata	2,622	86.3
Nagasaki	2,546	65.7
Fukushima	2,131	86.9
Tochigi	2,109	89.3
Ehimo	2,010	87.1
Toyama	1,919	92.9
Aomori	1,868	85.9
Yamanishi	1,684	86.7
Kumamoto	597	71.1
Tottori	1,560	93.0
Iwate	1,516	83.3
Shimane	1,381	84.0
Saga	1,342	88.2
Akita	1,068	88.8
Kagawa	1,029	80.2
Miyazaki	1,002	80.4
Rochi	933	86.2
Yamagata	693	80.9
Kagoshima	480	36.6
Tokushima	322	77.0
Okinawa	216	3.9
TOTAL	646,191	86.2

Source: Japanese Justice Ministry

In early times Korean residents in Japan were heavily concentrated in mine-rich Fukuoka and Hokkaido. Many of them moved to such light industry areas as Hyogo and Aichi Prefectures. Table IX indicates that Osaka, a center of commerce and industry, attracted many of them. Those working in mining and odd jobs outnumbered all others but as time went by, an increasing number of the residents engaged in engineering, industry, commerce and agriculture, showing that they managed to achieve relative security in living.[37] (See Tables X, XI, XII.)

In analyzing the percentage ratio of occupations held by the Korean residents in Japan from 1940 to 1952, it is noted in Tables X, XI, XII, that Mining, Industry, and Construction showed a decrease of 47.6 percent, and Agriculture and Transportation, a decrease of 14.9 percent. Conversely, in Commerce, there was an increase of 3.6 percent, and in Jobless and Others, an increase of 48.9 percent. This indicates the changes in the occupations held by Koreans after World War II. The reason nearly 60,000 Korean residents lost their jobs in 1952 was primarily: (1) decrease of labor demand in such areas as Mining, Industry, and Construction; and (2) the fact that many sought opportunities in Commerce and Trade. This is an indication that the economic conditions of most Korean residents in Japan did not change greatly since the 1930's. The jobless status of Korean residents did not seem to be temporary but rather appeared to be semi-permanent.

TABLE X

Breakdown of Occupations Held by Korean Residents
Before W.W. II.

Occupation	1920	%	1930	%	1940 (1940)	%
Agriculture/Forestry	1,287	3.7	20,058	7.7	27,511	5.2
Fishery	594	1.7	1,444	0.5	4,094	0.8
Mining	5,534	15.8	16,304	6.3	68,636	13.1
General Industry	12,138	34.5	74,396	28.6	179,976	34.3
Construction	7,290	20.8	63,770	24.6	100,258	19.1
General Commerce	1,215	3.4	17,892	6.9	32,104	6.3
Second Hand Goods Store					38,104	7.3
Service/Bar	558	1.6	8,956	3.4	6,914	1.3
Transportation	4,113	11.7	20,985	8.1	36,238	7.0
Public Service	372	1.0	1,465	0.5	10,848	2.1
Domestic	4		3,368	1.3	4,224	0.8
Day Laborer	2,109	5.8	19,125	7.4	13,927	20.7
Others			12,247	4.7		
Sub Total	35,214	100.0	260,010	100.0	523,293	100.0
Job Holders		86.4		62.0		42.1
Jobless	1,441		24,931		178,580	
(Living on Income)	81	3.6	12	6.1	892	14.5
(Without Occupation)	1,360		5,618		955	
(Students)			18,974		174,546	
(In Prison)			327		2,187	
Total	36,655		284,941		701,873	
Dependents	4,100	10.0	134,068	31.9	539,442	43.4
Grand Total	40,755	100.0	419,009	100.0	1241,315	100.0

Source: "Overall Study of Koreans in Japan," Pak Chae-il, pp. 53-54.

TABLE XI

Breakdown of Occupations Held by Korean Residents After WW. II.

(1952)

Occupation	Male	Female	Total	%
Agriculture/Forestry	7,059	3,097	10,156	5.3
Fishery	639	162	801	0.4
Mining	53	-0-	53	-
General Industry	19,793	4,780	24,573	12.6
Construction	19,600	391	19,991	10.3
General Commerce	26,520	4,666	31,186	16.1
Service/Bar	3,585	1,572	5,157	2.7
Entertainment	5,687	1,520	7,207	3.7
Transportation	5,752	126	5,878	3.0
Public Service	5,814	1,423	7,237	3.7
Day Laborer	29,790	5,798	35,588	18.4
Others	28,241	17,843	46,084	23.8
Sub Total	152,533	41,378	193,911	100.0
Without Occupation	85,464	47,968	133,432	24.9
(Students)	(48,078)	(43,622)	(91,700)	(17.1)
(Jobless)	(37,386)	(4,346)	(41,732)	(7.8)
Total	237,997	89,346	327,343	61.1
Dependents	64,304	144,157	208,461	38.9
Grand Total	302,301	233,503	535,804	100.0

Source: "Overall Study of Koreans in Japan," Pak Chae-il, p. 69.

TABLE XII

Comparison of Occupations Held by Koreans in Japan
Before and After WW. II.

Occupation	1940 (a)	1952 (b)	a - b
Mining, Industry, & Construction	66.5 %	18.9 %	- 47.6 %
Agriculture, Transportation, & Free Enterprise	15.1	10.2	- 4.9
Commerce	14.9	18.5	+ 3.6
Day Laborer, Domestic Help, Jobless, and Others	3.5	52.4	+ 48.9

Source: "Overall Study of Koreans in Japan," Pak Chae-il. p. 70.

C. INTEREST GROUPS

Koreans in Japan were greatly affected by the Korean War in 1950. The conflict in their homeland, in turn, intensified the political differences among Koreans in Japan. They were divided into two major factions, each separately favoring either North or South Korea.

The Minsen (Korean United Democratic Front in Japan), which subsequently was dissolved to form the Chosoren (see Table XIII), a pro-North Korean faction, had spread propaganda defending the actions of North Korea. It also raised funds for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and sent letters of encouragement to its troops. Gradually, it formed close ties with the Japanese Communist Party. Throughout 1951 and the first half of 1952, riots between Communists and the Japanese police increased in industrial areas. Japanese Communists and Korean supporters of Kim Il-sung usually formed the core of these disturbances. When the Minsen cooperated even more closely with the Japanese Communist Party after the Korean armistice in July, 1953, the Japanese government increased its security control over Koreans in Japan. However, by 1954, Korean communists in both Japan and North Korea began to feel that the Minsen's preoccupation with revolution in Japan was a mistake. Consequently, the Minsen was dissolved in May 1955.[38]

Even after the Korean War, the political configuration of Korean organizations in Japan has remained basically unchanged. Whether pro-North or pro-South Korean faction, or neutral, each group had contacts with Japanese organizations that supported

their activities, all closely connected with the politics of the Korean peninsula. The result was that the pro-North and the pro-South factions were unable to agree on any issue.[39]

The Chosoren (see Table XIII), which was organized in May 1955, is the pro-North group and is the larger faction of the two. It is under the direct control of North Korea, and was created to replace Minsen. Although Chosoren maintained its connection with the Japanese communist movement, unlike the old Minsen, it pursued its own self-interests and did not allow itself to be used. The two main themes of Chosoren were to protect the livelihood of Koreans in Japan and to promote the aims of North Korea. According to the Ministry of Justice in January 1965, 349,407 Koreans were registered under Chosun (North Korea) and 230,072 under Hanguk, loyal to South Korea.[40] However, a look at the places of origin of these Koreans in Japan shows that the largest number came from Kyongsang-namdo, the second and third largest groups coming from Kyongsang-pukto and Cholla-namdo, followed by Cholla-pukto and Chungchong-namdo. In other words, rural people from southern provinces accounted for most of the Koreans in Japan. Far smaller numbers originated in Kyonggi-do and the northern provinces. In summary, over 90 percent of Koreans in Japan were from South Korea. (See Table XIV.)

Under the leadership of Han Duk-su, the goals of Chosoren were: (1) the peaceful unification of Korea, (2) the protection of Korean racial rights, (3) the promotion of racial education, and (4) the normalization of relations between North Korea and Japan.[41] They have not only their own

TABLE XIII

PRO-NORTH KOREA FACTIONS

"MINSEI"		"CHOREN"	
Organized	March 16, 1947	Organized	October 15, 1945
Forced Dissolution	September 8, 1949	Forced Dissolution	September 8, 1949

"SO BO-I" TAI		"MINSEN"	
Organized	July 1951	Organized	January 9, 1951
Dissolved	May 26, 1955	Dissolved	May 26, 1955

"CHOSOREN" (in Japanese)
"CHOCHONGNYON" (in Korean)

Organized May 26, 1955

Affiliated Groups and Organizations in Japan

1. Chosen Youth League
2. Chosen Democratic Republic Women's League
3. Chosenjin Educational Committee
4. Chosenjin Teachers League
5. Chosenjin Scientist Organization
6. Chosen Writers and Artists League
7. Chosen Language Publishers Committee
8. Chosen Students in Japan League
9. Chosen Commerce and Industry Cooperation
10. Chosenjin Credit Association (Union) Committee
11. Chosenjin Athletic Organization
12. Unification of Chosen Committee
13. Chosenjin Buddhist Organization
14. Chosen Shim-po-sha (Communication)
15. Chosen Tsu-shinsha (Communication)
16. Ku-wol Publishers
17. Gaku-u Publishers
18. Chosen Pictorial Publications
19. Chosen Central Artists Troupe
20. Chosen Opera Troupe
21. "Chosen" Central Lyceum
22. Tokai Commerce Corporation
23. Chosen University, elementary, middle and high schools

Source: An Inner Aspect of the Chosoren Education in Communism, Young-hoon Lee, p. 124.

TABLE XIV

PLACE OF ORIGIN OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN
(As of April 1, 1974)

Provinces	Number of Persons
Kyongsang-namdo	246,638
Kyongsang-pukto	158,683
Cholla-namdo	61,438
Cheju-do	101,378
Cholla-pukto	12,064
Chungchong-namdo	13,053
Chungchung-pukto	11,459
Kyonggi-do	5,410
Seoul	9,462
Kangwon-do	4,971
Pyongan-namdo	1,867
Pyongyang	217
Pyongan-pukto	1,134
Hamgyong-namdo	2,173
Hamgyong-pukto	700
Hwanghae-do	1,284
Hwanghae-namdo	102
Hwanghae-pukto	85
Yanggang-do	2
Changang-do	18
Undetermined	6,683
TOTAL	638,806

Source: Japanese Justice Ministry

propaganda network, periodicals, newspapers, books and magazines, but also import various publications directly from North Korea.

A major item in the education budget of the North Korean government has been the support of a school system maintained for Korean residents in Japan. Through the Korean Red Cross Society, the government transmitted payments to the Central Educational Association of Koreans in Japan, an affiliate of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (see Table XV).

TABLE XV

EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND SCHOLARSHIP FUNDS RECEIVED BY CHOSOREN AND MINDAN

Year	Mindan	Chosoren
1957	$ 22,000	$ 615,580
1958	74,800	556,136
1959	186,000	808,432
1960	367,200	1,165,256
1961	260,659	1,141,854
1962	214,238	1,551,305
1963	115,486	2,197,396
1964	119,294	2,026,750
1965	120,054	2,018,752
1966	321,121	2,021,600
1967	495,532	2,500,090
1968	564,510	2,295,285
1969	717,190	2,715,393
1970	Unknown	2,676,703
TOTAL	$3,578,087	$24,290,535

Source: Jeon Joon, "A Study of Chosoren II," p. 197.
Yoosang Rhee, "A Study of Overseas Education," pp. 35-36.

In 1974, there were approximately 170,000 school age children in Japan. Of these, about 134,000 students attended Japanese schools (80%), and 35,000 (18%) attended the Chosoren-affiliated schools. The distribution and the number of students in the Mindan-affiliated schools (2%) are as follows (see Tables XVI, XVII).

TABLE XVI

THE NUMBER OF KOREAN STUDENTS
ATTENDING MINDAN-AFFILIATED SCHOOLS
(July 1, 1974)

Schools	Tokyo	Osaka	Kyoto	Kenkoku School (Neutral)
Kindergarten		82		
Elementary	172	247		130
Middle	127	95	49	133
High Schools	219	122	118	335
TOTAL	518	546	167	598

Source: The Sociological-Historical Characteristics of Koreans in Japan, from the "Society of the Korean Residents of Today," Koo-hong Lee, p. 43.

TABLE XVII

THE NUMBER OF KOREAN STUDENTS
IN CHOSOREN-AFFILIATED SCHOOLS
(1970)

SCHOOLS	1968		1969	
	No. of Schools	No. of Students	No. of Schools	No. of Students
Kindergarten	34			
Elementary School	90	15,841	51	11,336
Middle School	45	10,050	34	13,223
High School	9	7,564	9	10,170
University	1	933	1	950

Source: "A Study of Overseas Education," p. 37, Yoosang Rhee.

Han Duk-su, Chairman of the Central Standing Committee of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, announced on December 22, 1978 the 70th installment of the education aid fund and stipends sent to Kim Il-sung for the development of the democratic national education of the Korean residents in Japan.[42] The 500 million yen ($1 million) was sent for the children of Korean residents in Japan. Thus, for more than 20 years since 1957, the total education aid fund in the amount of 25,862,827,033 yen ($51,725,654.00) was received by Chosoren.[43] These funds were distributed in the form of school grants and student scholarships.

Consequently, a complete system of education was offered, from nursery school to training at Chosen University in Tokyo. Schools followed the same basic program and structure as those in North Korea and included over 35,000 students (see Tables XVI, XVII). Communist ideology, including the description of Americans and Japanese as imperialist aggressors, was emphasized in the curricula. Japanese authorities have attempted to control the system; however, in 1974 the communist and socialist parties and allied organizations of Japan had successfully blocked passage of legislation which would have placed this system under the control of the central Japanese government and it into conformity with the Japanese school system.[44]

Among the Japanese political parties which support the activities of Chosoren are: The Japanese Communist Party, the Japanese Socialist Party, and the Komeito. These parties extend their strong support to Kim Il-sung's Chuche

(Self-reliance) government in North Korea. Further, they support the policy of Kim Il-sung to unify Korea, to strengthen ties between Japan and North Korea, to develop North Korea, and to protect the human rights of Korean residents in Japan.[45]

The Mindan, which was established on October 3, 1946, under the leadership of Park Yol, is a pro-South faction (see Table XVIII).

TABLE XVIII

PRO-SOUTH KOREA FACTIONS

"SHINCHOSEN KENSETSU DO-MEI"	"CHOSEN KENKOKU SOKUSHIN SEINEN DO-MEI"
Organized January 20, 1946 Dissolved October 3, 1946	Organized November 16, 1945 Dissolved August 29, 1950

"MINDAN"

Organized: October 3, 1946

Affiliated Groups and Organizations in Japan

1. Kankoku Youth League (Organized August 29, 1950)
2. The League of Korean Students in Japan
3. Korean Soldiers Committee in Japan (Organized August 15, 1951)
4. Korean Women's Committee in Japan (Organized June 15, 1951)
5. Korean Athletic League in Japan
6. Korean Commerce and Industry Cooperation
7. Korean Education Suporters' Association
8. Korean Education Committee
9. Korean Credit Association (Union) Committee

Source: An 80-Year History of Korean Residents in Japan, Sang-hyon Kim, p. 84.

In reply to the North Korean propaganda campaign, Mindan launched one of its own, condemning the aggression and "Red Imperalism" of North Korea. During the Korean War, several hundred young Mindan supporters left for Korea and joined the South Korean army.[46] The membership, including affiliated groups, was 230,072 as of January 1965.[47] Due partly to the South Korean government's sustained endeavors to protect the rights and interests of Koreans in Japan since the normalization of diplomatic relations, and with disillusionment over the idolization of Kim Il-sung (which has been forced upon Chosoren members), including number of Koreans dissociated themselves from Chosoren and affiliated with Mindan.

Mindan was similar to Chosoren: (1) it was dedicated to promoting the welfare of Koreans living in Japan, and (2) it was strongly anti-Japanese. However, unlike Chosoren, Mindan received very little financial or moral support from South Korea. This situation changed after the Pak Chung-hee takeover of the South Korean government in April 1960 (see Table XV).

From its inception, Mindan was the weaker of the two factions. It was organized under the leadership of a middle class group, who no longer identified with the majority of the Koreans in Japan. Unlike Chosoren, it lacked a strong ideology to unite the majority of the Koreans. The lack of a set goal, intense factionalism, and its inability to capture the support of Korean residents caused Mindan to occupy a second position. Thus, when an earlier faction, Choren, was

dissolved by government decree in September 1949, Mindan lost its great change to surpass its rival, Chosoren.[48]

The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan is supporting the activities of the Mindan-affiliated organizations in Japan and South Korea.[49] It played a supportive role in promoting an early conclusion of the South Korea-Japan treaty and made a major capital investment in South Korea to strengthen its economy. (See Chapter V.)

Chosoren and Mindan are dividing the Korean community in Japan into two groups causing serious confrontation between the Korean residents there. The ideological clashes and hostility between the opposing groups operate to widen the gulf between them.

II. THE SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN TREATY OF 1965

A. THE LEGAL POSITION OF KOREANS IN JAPAN

The normalization of relations between South Korea and Japan was accomplished in Tokyo on June 22, 1965, after fourteen years of negotiations. The treaty restored diplomatic relations between the two countries for the first time since the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. Fifty-five years had passed since the annexation, including thirty-six years during which Korea was under Japanese colonial rule. (See Appendix for the text of the Treaty.)

On August 14, 1965, the South Korean Congress ratified the South Korea-Japan Treaty (despite a boycott from the opposition party of -two members): one hundred ten voted for, none voted against, and one abstained.[50]

The Japanese Diet ratified the treaty on November 12, 1965, the representatives from both nations officially exchanged the ratified documents and the South Korea-Japan Treaty became effective.[51] South Korea and Japan had begun preliminary talks on October 20, 1951.[52]

Besides the Treaty on Basic Relations, the important agreements that required ratification were the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and Economic Cooporation, the Agreement on Fisheries and Peace Line, the Agreement on the Legal Status and Treatment of Korean residents in Japan, and the Agreement on Art Objects and Cultural Cooperation. In addition to these agreements, twenty other documents were signed on the same date.[53]

The preliminaries in October 1951 were the first official contact between the two countries after the defeat of Japan. The talks were urged and arranged by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP), after the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan had been signed but before it took legal effect on April 18, 1952. Both sides agreed to place the following issues on the agenda: the legal status and treatment of Koreans residing in Japan and the question of title to vessels in Korean harbors at the time of the Japanese surrender on August 9, 1945.[54] However, South Korea's request to include the fisheries issue was refused by Japan. In late 1951, the preliminary talks were suspended, no progress having been made in resolving the issues.[55]

The first formal South Korea-Japan conference (February-April 1952) discussed the issues concerning basic (or diplomatic) relations; South Korea's claims to compensation for losses of property and lives under Japanese rule; and Japanese claims to compensation for property formally held in Korea, in addition to the issues already opened to discussion in the preliminary talks. The Treaty of Basic Relations was in reality a treaty of friendship and trade.[56]

During successive conferences, a number of important issues were added. They were the Peace Line (or Rhee Line, as it is called by Japan): the question of title to Dokto (Takeshima in Japanese), which consists of two small islands; South Korea's demand for the return of Korean art objects removed to Japan; the fate of Japanese fishermen interned in South Korea for violation of the Peace Line, and of the Koreans detained in

the Japanese detention camp in Ohmura, Japan; the repatriation of Koreans residing in Japan to North Korea; and, above all, the question of "two Koreas" and jurisdictional control of the South Korean government in the Korean peninsula.[57]

B. THE TREATY OF BASIC RELATIONS

The South Korean government insisted that a Japanese apology for the unfortunate past be formalized in a treaty that Japan explicitly recognize that the unfortunate past between the two countries was due mainly to the immoral and illegal Japanese occupation of Korea; and that Japan specifically repudiate all previous treaties or agreements that had subjugated the old empire of Korea into a part of the Japanese colonial empire.[58]

On October 22, 1948, immediately after South Korea became independent, President Rhee said, "We are trying to forget and will forget the past. If the Japanese would meet the Koreans with truthfulness and sincerity, friendly relations would be renewed. We believe in peaceful coexistence with a neighboring country."[59] President Rhee suggested normalization of trade relations between the two countries as the first step toward normalization of diplomatic relations, even before a peace treaty was concluded between Japan and the Allied powers.

Finally, the Korean insistence on an official apology from Japan was satisfied. On February 17, 1965, Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburo came to Seoul to initiate a tentative draft of Treaty on Basic Relations and said, "I...really regret an unfortunate period existed in the long history of the two nations, and deeply reflect on such a past."[60]

The South Korea-Japan Treaty was in itself a unique treaty dealing with fundamental issues, for which there was no historical precedent. The treaty was, for all practical purposes, one of the peace treaties. After Korea was annexed by the Japanese in 1910, and until it gained independence after World War II, Korea had been under Japanese colonial rule. In order to replace the past relationship between the two nations, a step had to be taken to establish new directions.

The Treaty on Basic Relations of June 22, 1965, specified:

1. both countries would exchange diplomatic missions and establish ambassadorial and embassy relations;
2. all the treaties and agreements concluded prior to August 22, 1910, between the two countries were null and void (Article II).

In Article III, the government of South Korea, "as specified on No. 195 (III), of the resolution of the U.N. General Assembly,...(was acknowledged as) the sole lawful government of Korea."[61]

On the matter of South Korea's claim in divided Korea, the treaty recognized South Korea as the sole lawful government as it was speciried in the resolution of the U.N. General Assembly.[62] Further, the South Korean government maintained that it was the only legitimate government representing the whole of Korea and its administrative and jurisdictional control covered not only the Korean peninsula but all of the offshore islands.[63]

C. THE LEGAL STATUS AND TREATMENT OF KOREANS IN JAPAN

The problems of the Korean minority in Japan formed an important chapter in the history of the Korea-Japan negotiations.[64]

In an attempt to clarify the status of the Koreans for administrative purposes, on November 20, 1946 the SCAP decreed that Koreans in Japan were to be treated as Japanese nationals. The Koreans refused to accept that status, however, and demanded equality with Allied nationals in Japan. Consequently, in June 1948, the SCAP accorded the Koreans a special status--"semi-independent" from the Japanese nationality. The SCAP further increased the uncertainty when, in a memorandum to the Japanese authorities on June 27, 1950, he stated that the status of Koreans was undetermined until such time as the South Korean government and Japan should conclude an agreement following the Peace Treaty.[65]

In the meantime, Japan had enacted the Alien Registration Law of May 2, 1947, which required Koreans to register as nationals of either "Chosen" (North Korea) or "Kankoku" (South Korea). On April 28, 1952, the Japanese government enacted Law No. 126, which permitted continued residence to those Koreans who had entered Japan prior to September 2, 1945, until such time as their status and the period of their stay might be determined by some future law.[66] Thus, the status of the Koreans in Japan remained uncertain. They were sometimes referred to as "nationals of a third country," or treated as foreigners or nationals of Japan.

In October 1951, when South Korea and Japan opened negotiations, the basic position of South Korea was as follows:

1. In determining the status of Koreans in Japan, the unique historical circumstance of their existence in Japan must be the foremost consideration.

2. Given this circumstance, a favorable legal status unique among aliens in Japan should be given to the Koreans, with the privilege of permanent residence for themselves and their descendants and with freedom to remove their personal property and funds to the Republic of Korea when they choose to return there.

3. Koreans in Japan should be accorded the same privilege and opportunity in matters of education, health, social security, employment, business activities, and property rights as enjoyed by Japanese nationals.

4. All Koreans in Japan must be treated as the nationals of the Republic of Korea under the protection of the Republic of Korea (not North Korea).[67]

The Japanese recognized the unique origin of Koreans in Japan, but would not grant favorable legal status and treatment to Koreans to the prejudice of other aliens in Japan.[68]

In the first conference in 1952, Japan agreed to classify all Koreans as nationals of South Korea. Japan strongly favored doing so, for fear that South Korea might demand Japanese citizenship as the right of Koreans in Japan.[69] However, in subsequent conferences, the main point of discussion was the right of the Japanese authorities to deport Koreans. Under the Japanese Immigration Control Ordinance, a Korean could, for example, be arrested and sentenced to up to one year of imprisonment for not carrying his alien registration card (Article XVIII) and could then be deported for having been imprisoned (Article XXIV).[70]

Further negotiations on the status and treatment of Koreans were brought to a standstill by the 1959 mass repatriation by Japan of Koreans to North Korea. The mass repatriation provided Japan with a partial solution to the pressing problems of the Korean minority in the country, but it worsened relations between South Korea and Japan.[71]

Under the Agreement on the Legal Status and Treatment of the Nationals of South Korea residing in Japan as of June 22, 1965, Japan granted the right of permanent residence to all nationals of South Korea who entered Japan prior to the end of World War II (August 16, 1945) and who had resided in Japan continuously from that date as well as to second and third generation Korean residents. The agreement also guaranteed that no national of South Korea would be deported to South Korea unless he was sentenced in Japan to long imprisonment for serious crimes.

At the same time, the Japanese government authorized the Koreans to enter the private and public Japanese elementary schools, high schools, and the higher educational institutions. A livelihood, social welfare, and health benefits were also guaranteed. Japan also assured the South Korean government that it would give "due considration" to the matter of removal of personal property and remission of funds. Consequently, those who renounced permanent residence and returned to Korea were allowed to carry or send home up to ten thousand dollars.[72]

The agreement did not clarify the citizenship of Koreans in Japan. The original Japanese position was to regard all Koreans in Japan as nationals of South Korea. However, after the Korean War, Japanese policy changed, and Koreans were

registered as the nationals of either "Chosen" or "Kankoku;" the latter applied only to those who carried identification cards issued by the South Korean Mission in Japan.[73] In either case, "Chosen" and "Kankoku" were to the Japanese government no more than geographical concepts.[74]

Koreans registered under "Chosen" were generally regarded as pro-Communists or neutrals favoring North Korea. Japanese Minister of Justice Ishii Mitsujiro testified in the Diet that, as of the end of January 1965, some 349,407 Koreans were registered under "Chosen" and 230,072 under "Kankoku."[75] However, the South Korean government's figures were different: the number of Koreans registered with Mindan (pro-South Korea) was 230,000 and with Chosoren (pro-North Korea), 170,000; neutrals numbered 175,000.[76]

The division of the Koreans in Japan by ideology or loyalty was the practical reason for Japan's refusal to assign them a single nationality, as demanded by South Korea. The agreement provided, however, that the benefits of this agreement were available only to those Koreans who presented evidence of citizenship from South Korea. The South Korean government anticipated that this agreement, along with normalization of over-all relations, would immensely strengthen its position among Koreans in Japan at the expense of North Korea. However, the Japanese government maintained that the Koreans who would not register with South Korea and therefore were not eligible for permanent residence and diplomatic protection of South Korea, would continue to enjoy the same treatment as they had received in the past.[77]

In discussing the legal status of Korean residents in Japan, it must be recalled that they were mobilized for war under Japanese colonial rule. Japan, however, does not seem to pay attention to this fact. Schools run by Koreans did not have equal status with Japanese schools. However, with the normalization of relations between South Korea and Japan, the Japanese government promised to forbid discriminatory treatment against Korean residents in Japan.

Although the Japanese government does not seem to show partiality toward Korean residents in Japan on the surface, they were and are subject to racial discrimination stemming from popular sentiments on the part of the Japanese.[78]

The Japanese contend that:

1. Though Japan was defeated in the Pacific War, Korea is indebted to her. However, Korea does not acknowledge it;

2. Koreans practiced atrocities on Japanese at the time when the war was over; and

3. Korea joined the Allied Nations in making undue demands upon Japan.[79]

The Japanese government's discriminatory treatment led many Korean residents to become naturalized in Japan. Each year, 3,000 to 4,000 Koreans were naturalized on average until 1965 when the two countries normalized diplomatic relations. Naturalization is continuing though it has decreased sharply in recent years.[80]

Until the legal status of Korean residents in Japan was established, there existed no definite principles which were pursued in treating Korean residents. This inconsistency on

the part of the Japanese government's treatment of Korean residents helped the Japanese people to justify their rejection of Koreans to the disadvantage of Koreans. Since the scope of their economic activities was limited, Koreans tended to engage in such speculative jobs as running entertainment facilities and restaurants.

What is worse, in industry Korean residents in Japan have been bound by law to pay 20 percent more in taxes than the Japanese. Koreans earn an average of 40 percent less than their Japanese counterparts, but they must pay 10 percent more in taxes.[81]

This is an obvious reason for the lingering slump of businesses run by Korean residents in contrast to the rapid growth of the Japanese economy since the 1960's. Only 1,300 out of the 650,000 Korean residents belong to the wealthy class, accounting for 80 percent of the total income of Koreans in Japan. Most Koreans in Japan live close to the subsistence level.[82]

D. JAPAN'S ORGANIZATIONS DEALING WITH KOREANS

Among the various organizations in Japan which deal with Koreans, the fo lowing administrative organizations facilitate their stay in Japan.

The administration of entry and exit control of Korean residents is under the Entry Administrative Office of the General Ministry of Justice. Under this office are the local entry control offices, their branches, and other facilities. The entry control station of the Ministry of Justice is

headed by its administrative chief, the assistant, and the secretary, and consists of six sections:

1. The General Affairs Department. This office handles the overall planning of entry and exit control, drawing up laws and ordinances, maintaining liaison with each related branch, investigation analysis, collection of information, general items concerning foreign residents, entry inspection officers, distribution and regulations of the entry guards, camps to accommodate the persons who entered the country, and the entry control offices.

2. The Entry Investigation Section. This office handles the landing investigation and permits of foreigners, the exit and return of Japanese, and the supervision of the chiefs of the vessels which handle the matters concerning entry and exit and of the transporters.

3. The Qualification Investigation Section. This section handles the procurement of qualification credentials of the foreign residents in Japan, the changes and renewal of the duration of stay, the issuance of permanent resident permits to foreigners, and the issuance of re-entry permits to foreigners.

4. The Judgment Section. This section handles the investigation of violations, matters concerning the issuance of deportation orders, the landing of foreigners, the oral investigation of deportation, the formal objections,and the payment of compensation to informers.

5. The Defense (Guard) Section. This office handles the investigation of violations, detention orders, execution of deportation orders, repatriation of foreigners rescued from the

sea, guarding of the detention camp for foreigners, the temporary release and treatment of detainees, the payment and repayment of security, and items concerning the weapons carried by entry guard officers and entry investigation officers.

6. The Registration Section. This office handles the registration of foreigners and the arrangement and storage of the records pertaining to their entry, exit, and registration.

Of the foreigners detained by the entry control office, Southern Koreans, North Koreans, and Korean residents in Japan are sent to Ohmura Camp, while other foreigners are sent to Yokohama Camp to await their repatriation.

III. THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF KOREANS IN JAPAN

A. CHOSOREN AND THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY

From their inception the Japanese Communist Party led and guided the Choren and the Minsen.[83] The relationship between the factions and the Japanese Communist Party, however, was based on the latter's view that Korean residents were a minority in Japan, and therefore, quite unlike the colonial ruler-subject relationship which had existed before 1945.

The Chosoren, however, demanded that Korean residents be treated as foreigners, not as a minority race, in Japan. Consequently, at the 6th General Conference of the Japanese Communist Party, the demand of the Chosoren was acknowledged, and the relationship between the two groups changed from "lead and guide" to "active support" by the Japanese Communist Party. Subsequently, the factions were dissolved and their members joined other organizations.[84]

Most former faction members joined Chosoren, while a smaller number were assimilated into the Japanese Communist Party. In 1955, out of approximately 30,000 former Choren and Minsen members, approximately 27,000 joined the Chosoren, and 3,000 members joined the Japanese Communist Party. With Han Duk-su as its leader, the Chosoren began to purge the opposing members within the faction.[85]

In February 1959 and again in March 1966, Kenji Miyamoto visited Pyongyang as a representative of the Japanese Communist Party. On Miyamoto's first visit, the Miyamoto organization

had not been formed, and therefore the visit was chiefly aimed at establishing friendship between the Pyongyang government and the Japanese Communist Party. Consequently, the problem of the Chosoren was not discussed at the first meeting.

When Miyamoto visited Pyongyang for the second time the Miyamoto organization was not only securely established but also considering altering the party's direction in Japan. Hence, there were differences of opinion between Miyamoto and Kim Il-sung. Miyamoto pointed out that North Korea's anti-government guerrilla operations in South Korea were unlikely to succeed, and criticized Kim Il-sung for carrying out such operations. Consequently, the Miyamoto-Kim Il-sung debates ended, for all practical purposes.[86]

The relationship between North Korea and the Japanese Communist Party under Miyamoto cooled considerably and the relationship between the Japanese Communist Party and the Chosoren also cooled. The 11th General Conference of the Japanese Communist Party, in July 1970, also chilled North Korea and Japanese Communist Party relations. At the conference, the Miyamoto organization changed direction by replacing the bloody revolutionary form with 'parliamentarianism.' On this issue there was a great deal of controversy in Japan. However, as long as the Miyamoto organization stayed in power, the Japanese Communist Party followed the policy of 'parliamentarianism.' Their change of direction was a shock to the North Korean government and in many of the subsequent reports made by Han Duk-su the phrase 'the Japanese comrade members' was changed to 'the Japanese working class.'[87]

In September 1970, Chiki Narita of the Japanese Socialist Party visited Pyongyang. This visit was a "goodwill and friendship" visit.[88]

Originally, the Japanese Socialist Party did not concern itself much with the problems of Koreans in Japan. While the Japanese Communist Party was closely associated with the Korean residents even before World War II, the Japanese Socialist Party had never studied the Korean resident problems.

The Japanese Socialist Party took a strong position in opposing the South Korea-Japan Treaty, and against authorizing the establishment of the Chosen Un ersity but as a party it was never actively involved with Korean problems. However, among the Japanese Socialist Party members were some politicians and scholars who, independently and as individuals, dealt actively with problems such as the repatriation of Korean residents and the right to travel freely, and also opposed bills concerning schools for foreigners and international immigration control.[89]

The indifferent attitude of the Japanese Socialist Party toward Chosoren did not have any significant impact on Chosoren as long as the Japanese Communist Party and Chosoren maintained their close ties. The Japanese Socialists Party's indifferent attitude toward Chosoren derived from the fact that Chosoren did not have the 'vote' or the right to vote. Similarly, Mindan, which did not have the 'vote' or the right to vote, was subjected to indifferent treatment by the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party.[90]

B. ECONOMIC STATUS AFTER THE SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN TREATY OF 1965

With the phenomenal growth in the Japanese economy, one could speculate that the people would benefit from such favorable conditions. However, the rate of such growth among Koreans in Japan was not as significant as that of the Japanese. The majority of Korean residents were farmers, fishermen, service, and factory workers. A small number were engaged in the operational and managerial fields. The following table indicates the degree of affluence among Korean residents.

TABLE XIX

THE ECONOMIC STRATA OF THE KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN (1968-1970)

Strata	Core Members	Number of Household	Number of Family	Ability to Cope With Japanese Economy
Very Wealthy	120	120	500	Strong
Wealthy	5,100	5,100	15,000	
Middle Income	6,500	6,500	18,000	Doubtful
Lower Income	115,000	115,000	350,000	None
Extremely Poor	55,000	55,000	150,000	Group Living
Others			70,000	Welfare Recipients
TOTAL	181,720	181,720	603,500	

Source: "A Study of Chosoren II," Jeon Joon, p. 177.

Those in the "Very Wealthy" and the "Wealthy" categories number approximately 5,200. These could cope with the unfavorable downturn in the Japanese economy. However, those who belong in the "Middle Income" category do not have a firm position for survival. Those in the "Lower Income" and below can be considered submerged by the Japanese economic waves.

Although the standard of living of Korean residents is gradually paralleling the rise among the Japanese as a whole, the gap between the two groups is widening.

Among Korean residents, the salaried people such as technicians, teachers, and company employees belong to either the "Middle Income" or the "Lower Income" group. The number of salaried Koreans is very small in Japan. The majority of them are employed generally in the business firms operated by Korean residents, or in the Mindan or Chosoren-operated organizations. In comparison to their Japanese counterparts, these Koreans receive lower salaries. For example, teachers employed by the Mindan schools receive a monthly compensation of 45,000 Yen and Chosoren school employees 51,000 Yen, while their Japanese colleagues receive 65,000 Yen. In the business field, an average monthly salary received by members of the Mindan organizations was 46,000 Yen, in the Chosoren organizations 50,000 Yen, compared to 68,000 Yen received by Japanese in similar occupations.[91] The situation is different in the professional or technical field; they command pay equivalent to that of the Japanese. However, such opportunities tend to be closed to Korean residents.

Finally, those in the "Extremely Poor" category and "Others" usually live collectively. Although collective group living is similar to that prevalent before World War II, the number of such groups has increased.

Concerning the actual income earned by Korean residents and the taxes levied on such income, there was, in the first place, no legislative announcement by the Japanese authorities regarding the tax rates. Second, the title to the properties or the business enterprises are usually recorded under the name of the Japanese spouse. Third, depending upon their status, whether Japanese citizen or permanent resident, a different tax rate would apply. Given such a system, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to produce accurate figures. The following statistics may throw some light on the situation.

Since 1961, in comparison to the Japanese nationals, the revenue of Korean residents decreased by 40 percent, while they paid 10 percent more in taxes. (See Tables XX, XXI.)

Furthermore the Korean residents in industry are in a very disadvantageous position. In reality, Korean residents must pay 20 percent more in taxes than the Japanese. This is due primarily to the fact that there were practically no provisions made for some of the legal organizations or industry to qualify them for tax exemptions. Another reason is that the majority of the Korean residents hold occupations which would place them under the more heavily taxed category.

Consequently, as of April 1974, the status of Korean residents in Japan had not improved economically, accounting for a jobless rate of more than 50 percent. (See Table XXII.)

TABLE XX

ESTIMATED INCOME OF THE KOREAN RESIDENTS

Year	Japanese Population (1,000,000)	Japanese Income	Tax Per Person 1,000 (Yen)	Koreans in Japan Population (100,000)	Koreans in Japan Total Income (Yen) (1,000,000)	Tax (1,000 Yen) Per Person
1961	94	15,755.1	167	567	56,901	100
1962	95	17,729.8	186	569	63,633	111
1963	96	20,607.2	214	573	73,715	128
1964	97	23,329.3	240	578	83,327	144
1965	98	26,000.3	264	583	92,611	158
1966	99	30,273.4	305	585	107,325	183
1967	100	35,792.2	357	587	125,772	214
1968	101	42,143.0	415	592	147,835	249

Source: "Annual Report of the Economic Statistics," 1970 Nenkan, Statistics Department, Japanese Banks.

- The Revenue of the Korean residents was calculated at a figure lower by 40 percent than the Japanese.

TABLE XXI

TAXES PAID BY THE KOREAN RESIDENTS

Year	Japanese Population (1,000,000)	Japanese Total Taxes (Billion)	Tax Per Person 1,000 Yen	Korean Residents in Japan Population (100,000)	Korean Residents in Japan Total Taxes 1,000 (Yen)	Korean Residents in Japan Tax Per Person 1,000 (Yen)
1961	94	31,342	33	567	20,748	36
1962	95	34,474	36	569	22,683	39
1963	96	39,446	41	573	25,868	45
1964	97	45,588	46	578	29,852	51
1965	98	48,291	49	583	31,534	54
1966	99	54,316	54	585	35,302	60
1967	100	65,463	65	587	42,392	71
1968	101			592		

-An additional 10 percent tax was added to the taxes payable by the Korean residents.

TABLE XXII

OCCUPATIONAL BREAKDOWNS OF KOREANS IN JAPAN
(April 1, 1974)

Occupation	Male	Female	Total
Technicians	615	16	631
Teachers	756	283	1,039
Medical and Nursing	544	323	867
Religious	204	70	274
Other Professions	568	99	667
Managers	4,595	202	4,797
Clerks	16,796	3,973	20,769
Importers and Exporters	181	4	185
Scrap Iron Dealers	7,112	382	7,494
Merchants	19,041	4,058	23,099
Agriculture and Forestry	2,737	962	3,699
Fisheries	243	130	373
Miners	463	21	484
Transportation and Communication	804	22	826
Construction	10,681	134	10,815
Skilled Manufacturers	31,051	3,858	34,909
Laborers	15,177	1,744	16,921
Cooks	1,422	116	1,538
Barbers and Beauticians	470	576	1,046
Entertainers	697	98	795
Other Services	2,069	956	3,025
Drivers	12,794	67	12,861
Artists	457	246	703
Writers	108	8	116
Reporters	162	21	183
Scientific Researchers	320	81	401
Housewives	-	724	724
Students	2,735	1,792	4,527
Jobless	155,929	218,711	374,640
Unclassified	492	209	701
Unavailable	47,564	62,133	109,697
Total	336,787	302,019	638,806

Source: Japanese Justice Ministry

IV. TIES WITH THE HOMELAND

A. THEIR VIEW OF HOMELAND

The number of overseas Koreans is estimated at approximately 2.5 million, with about one-third scattered in the United States, Japan, West Germany, Canada and other Free World countries and the rest in Communist countries.[83] The number of Korean residents in Japan is approximately 650,000 at present.[84]

Koreans in Free World countries are those who left Korea of their own accord for emigration, employment and study, carrying passports issued by the South Korean government. Therefore, their attachment to Korea as their homeland is presumably not much different from those held by the people of Korea, although some have been naturalized as citizens of their host countries.

However, Koreans in Japan and Communist countries have a different attitude toward their homeland. These attitudes are divisive and complex. The environment in Japan causes them to develop psychological complications stemming from the division of their homeland into two different political systems in the north and south. They are at times confused as to which side merits their allegiance. As a result, they feel complications not only about Korea as a geographical area but also about Korea--North and South--as two separate polities with different names. Those affiliated with the pro-North Korean Choseren do not consider Japan as their homeland.

Japan is not a monolithic society but a free and democratic society, and thus treats Koreans not as Japanese citizens but as aliens having ghe right to permanent residence in Japan.

Although these Chosoren-affiliated Koreans may view the homeland in the context of Communism, they also may have a spiritual homeland in their minds.

When speaking of national consciousness, one often cites the examples of Jews, Chinese and Japanese and especially their national solidarity and pride. Unlike these groups, the Korean people are not exclusive or militant but are strongly individualistic and perservering, and they are adaptable and disunited.[84]

The Korean disposition is attributed to the historical and geographical environment of Korea. Considering that Koreans have long lived under foreign rule without losing their national identify, perserverance is a valuable factor in their national character.[85]

National consciousness is a complex sense of family, a sense of living, a sense of thoughts, a sense of system and organization; and, therefore, it is under the influence of environmental factors such as society and international relations.

There is much evidence that Koreans in Communist countries have a strong national conscieousness. Foreigners visiting the Korean Autonomous District in China are surprised that they maintain the Korean style of living almost completely, speaking Korean, eating Korean food, living in ondol (hot floor) rooms and marrying other Koreans. In addition, they publish

Korean newspapers, and have Korean broadcasting stations and schools.[86]

Such a strong national consciousness is also found in the Korean community in Japan, in spite of its assimilative and discriminative policies. The result of a survey of Koreans in Japan concerning their national consciousness is shown in Table XXIII.

The survey was conducted just prior to the normalization of South Korea-Japan relations. The legal status of the persons who answered the questions was uncertain and, accordingly, they were not in a position to pass judgment on their future problems, including the naturalization of their children as Japanese citizens. This indicates that Koreans in Japan have the same strong feelings of national consciousness as Koreans at home.

Separately, some 1,500 Japanese were asked by Asahi, early in 1977 their choice of the 'most liked' country (sukina kuni). (See Table XXIV.) The results were as indicated.

The survey indicated that both Koreas were the least liked countries, and the second and third in the most hated country ranking behind the Soviet Union.

In general, first-generation overseas Koreans have stronger national consciousness than second-generation Koreans. This is due largely to the legal and social systems of the host countries, and the younger generations are realistic in adapting themselves to the new systems because public avowal may bring about social disadvantages and discrimination in their social life. Consequently, many second and third generation Koreans are assimilated

TABLE XXIII

NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF KOREANS IN JAPAN
(151 persons)

1. Do you take pride in having national consciousness as a Korean in Japan?
 Yes. 80 No. 66 Need not have it. 5

2. Does national consciousness cause any trouble in your daily living?
 Yes. 78 No. 22 Don't know. 51

3. Why do you have national consciousness?
 Matter of course as a Korean. 125
 To save my face as a Korean. 16 May do without it. 10

4. Is national consciousness necessary to your children?
 Yes. 45 No. 35 Don't know. 51

5. Do you want to be naturalized as a Japanese citizen?
 Yes. 13 No. 127 Yes. in the future. 11

6. What should be the nationality of your children?
 Korea. 50 Japan. 73 Don't care. 28

7. What if your children show no reaction to national consciousness?
 Can't help it. 102 They are wrong. 31 Don't care. 14

8. If you are naturalized as a Japanese citizen, you can visit Korea more easily, can't you?
 Yes. 5 Not always easy. 107
 Permanent residence and naturalization are different. 39

9. On what do you base your pride in being a Korean?
 Korean culture. 41 Korean history. 51
 Korean morality and etiquette. 59

10. Do you respect the Japanese people?
 Yes. 13 No. 29 Depends. 109

Source: Visit to Koreans in Japan, Sasanggye, April 1965.

TABLE XXIV

Sukina Kuni (Most Liked Country)

Switzerland	30.2 %
United States	30.0
Italy	22.0
Great Britain	19.0
China	6.8
Soviet Union	1.9
North Korea	0.6
South Korea	0.5

The question was turned around and asked to name the 'most hated' country (kirai). Here are the results:

Soviet Union	33.7 %
South Korea	22.0
North Korea	21.1
China	12.0
United States	4.7
India	3.8
West Germany	3.1
Great Britain	1.5
Switzerland	0.1

Source: Roger Swearinger, 'The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan' Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1978, pp. 99-102.

into the polities of the countries in which they live. The following survey appeared in Sankei, in December 1978.

Question: What do you think of having the following relationship with the South Korean people? (In the survey on the South Korean side, with the Japanese people.) (The following figures give the ratio to the whole of those who replied "very greatly in favor" and "generally in favor" combined.) (See Table XXV.)

The survey shows that the 43.9 percent of the Japanese who were interviewed answered that they would like to become close friends, individually, and 37.7 percent, to work as colleagues

TABLE XXV
JAPANESE VS SOUTH KOREAN

Japanese Side	Question	South Korean Side
8.2%	To become relatives through marriage	32.3%
43.9%	To become close friends, individually	76.0%
33.5%	To live nearby, as neighbors	78.2%
37.7%	To work as colleagues in the same workshop	76.5%
31.4%	To grant Japanese (South Korean) nationality	27.1%
60.1%	To accept them as travelers	93.8%
5.5%	Exclusion from Japanese (South Korean) society	13.4%

Method of Survey

On the Japanese side, questionnaires were distributed to 1,350 persons in Tokyo-to and 1,050 persons in Osaka City, with the objects chosen by the stratified, random-sampling method, from the first part of September to the middle of September. On the South Korean side, the survey was conducted through direct interviews, with 1,000 persons in Seoul City, and 210 persons in Taegu City as the objects, chosen by the same method, in June of this year.

Source: Sankei (page 5) (Full) December 28, 1978.

in the same workshop. This may be an improvement in their perception of and willingness to accept Koreans in Japan on a more favorable term.

It may be presumptuous, however, to assume that they are losing national consciousness as Koreans. As a man cannot be completely free from the instinctive and eternal character of his people (as an ethnic group) with changes in the environment the level of his national consciousness may change.

B. TIES WITH THE SOUTH

There is an old saying "even tigers look for homes when dying." All animals have a homing instinct that ties them to the place of their birth. For Koreans living in Japan, this old saying was the bitterest reminder of their plight.[87]

The South Korean government, with the cooperation with the South-North Red Cross and the South-North Coordinating Committee, actively supported the movement to help the Chosoren-affiliated Koreans in Japan visit their homeland. The project is now making great progress amid enthusiastic support and is welcomed by people all over the world.

The home visit campaign for Chosoren members brought closer to reality the goal or arranging the reunion of 10 million divided family members. This historic campaign began when more than 40 Chosoren Koreans entered Pusan on September 13, 1975, the first group of visitors to pay homage to their ancestors' tombs on Chusok Day, the most celebrated traditional holiday. It was the first visit to their homeland in more than 30 years. The first group was followed by 20 people arriving the next day, and 650 others who flew into Kimpo aboard Korean Air Lines flights on the 15th and 16th of that month. Young men, who had been taken away by the Japanese for forced labor or fighting in World War II, returned home as gray-haired old men.[88] The homebound visit which began on Chusok Day in 1975 brought to South Korea over 10,000 Chosoren Koreans, as of the New Year's Day, 1977.[89]

Great historical significance can be found in the movement for home visits by Chosoren Koreans in Japan. This campaign marked a turning point in north-south relations in Korea. It

had an immense political meaning in that, for the first time since the foundation of South Korea, so great a number of pro-North, Chosoren members visited South Korea. The home visits by Chosoren members aroused a strong national spirit among Koreans in and out of the country.

The South Korean government's firm principle of accepting members of Chosoren is purely a humanitarian project. At the time of tense political confrontation between the north and south, only this type of humanitarian movement which spans political differences can revive love of the nation and restore mutual trust. The success of the campaign to promote home visits for Chosoren Koreans privided new confidence in the future of north-south relations.

C. TIES WITH THE NORTH

Chosoren has dual functions in Japan, as the Japanese branch of the North Korean Labor Party and as the official North Korean representative.

At the time Chosoren was organized the North Korean government supported Han Duk-su and his followers. After giving power to Chosoren, North Korea insisted that it dissolve its affiliation with the Japanese Communist Party, and arm itself with devotion for Kim Il-sung. Based on this, Chosoren formed an organizational master-servant relationship with North Korea and assumed the role of front guard base in Japan for the communist unification of the Korean peninsula. In conflicts within Chosoren, the dissidents were either sent to North Korea or purged. Thus, North Korea had Chosoren adhere closely to their government and, in addition, had the

had the members pledge their allegiance to Kim Il-sung. In North Korea the leadership and supervision of Chosoren is the responsibility of the North Korean Labor Party. In particular, the anti-South Korea General Business Bureau handles problems concerning operations in South Korea, while the Resident General Bureau handles the other administrative affairs.

The North Korean government's guidelines toward Chosoren are:

1. Chosoren is affiliated with various organizations in North Korea and, further, heightens its goals of a unified Korea and loyalty to Kim Il-sung. Chosoren is affiliated with the 'Democratic Battle Front for the Unification of the Motherland' of North Korea, and is thus alloted seven seats as Diet members in the 'Supreme Peoples' Conference.' At the fifth election, which was held in December 1972, Han Duk-su, Lee Chin-kyu, Lee Ki-baek, Chung Chae-pil, Hong Bon-su, Yang Chong-ko and Pak Chung-ku, were elected. On various anniversaries North Korea granted official commendations for the staff and members and cheered loyal members. For example, in May 1970 (on the fifteenth anniversary of Chosoren) and in April 1972, decorations and meritorious service medals were conferred on nine hundred and two thousand people, respectively.

2. Each year, North Korea supports Chosoren with large operational funds. These have been sent to Chosoren in the form of educational aid and scholarship funds three to five times a year since April 1957. Further, these funds have become widely known as Kim Il-sung's "parental appropriation,' and thus trumpets its loyalty to their great leader. In 1976,

approximately 200 billion Yen was sent to Chosoren from North Korea; however, most of the money was spent on the Battle Front Base as operational funds for the anti-South Korea and Communist unification.

3. Beginning with the staff and members of Chosoren, and through visits to North Korea by Korean residents in Japan, North Korea is carrying out its direct guidance and orders.

When the Japanese government relaxed re-entry laws for Korean residents in Japan after visiting North Korea, Chosoren dispatched its staff members on anniversaries and commemorative occasions, and also allowed residents to visit their ancestral tombs. Such visitors numbered over one thousand at the end of 1976. During Chosoren members' stay in North Korea, they receive political lectures and training in 'Chuche' ideas, the Socialist system, and Chosoren activities. To the members in the higher echelons, the interviews, training, and words of encouragement are spoken directly by Kim Il-sung. This is known to Chosoren as 'the great leader's teachings,' and these are used as guiding principles for the organization and activities of Chosoren.

4. When Chosoren's cargo/passenger ship, 'Mankyung-bong Ho,' stops at Japanese ports, Chosoren affiliated members are let on board and are given direct guidance. Since August 1971, each time 'Mankyung-bong Ho' (3,573 tons), entered the ports of Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe, Chairman Han Duk-su, Chosoren's staff, and loyal members numbering more than 13,000 were invited aboard and given political lectures.

For all practical purposes "Mankyung-bong Ho' provided racial and revolutionary education for Chosoren members. In

addition, Chosoren conducted film viewings, informal discussions, lecture series, welcoming parties, and tours of the ship with Chosoren members and the North Korean representatives. In the Chosoren office, direct instructions to the Chosoren staff members were carried out in utmost secrecy through instructional documents and tape recordings.[90]

In addition, Korean residents maintain their ties with North Korea through the following organizations in Japan:

1. New Left Wing Power. The two organizations, 'The Cultured Man of New Democracy,' and "The Left Wing Radical Student Group,' represent the major new left wing powers in Japan. By making use of the Kim Dae-jung incident, these organizations attempted to embitter Japan-South Korea relations, and thus stood in the forefront of the anti-South Korea movement, gaining full coopration from the Chosoren.

The New Left Wing Power in Japan, together with the Chosoren, raised criticism against the South Korean state, and proposed the abrogation of the South Korea-Japan Basic Treaty, suspension of U.S.-Japan economic association with South Korea, and dissolution of Japan-South Korea Cabinet Members' Conference. They were also plotting to isolate South Korea from the international political arena and overthrow the South Korean government.

2. Nitcho Association (North Korea-Japan Association). Under the pretext of promoting economic and cultural exchange between North Korea and Japan, the Nitcho Association was formed on June 10, 1951. However, they used the First National Conference which was held in November 1955, to transform this

association into the 'Organization for the Promotion of Chosoren Support Cooperation,' and assumed the distinct characteristics of spokesman for the Chosoren and North Korea in Japan.

In order to effectively develop the Chosoren supporting activities, the Nitcho Association, under its umbrella, formed "The Nitcho Realization for Free Travel Liaison Committee," and on October 23, 1963, formed the "Committee for the Protection of Human Rights for Koreans in Japan." These organizations, together with the Chosoren's "Racial Rights Protection Enterprise," have developed various support activities to make possible exchanges between North Korea and Japan.

3. The Nitcho Trade Committee (North Korea-Japan Trade Committee). In response to a declaration by Nam Il, the Foreign Minister of North Korea, establishing normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan in February 1955, the Nitcho Trade Committee was organized on March 6, 1956, thus formalizing trade relations between Japanese companies and North Korean concerns.

The Nitcho Trade Committee furthered its friendship with North Korea under the principle of attaining equal and mutual benefits for both countries and, subsequently, when it was organized to promote trade negotiations by dispatching representatives from each company several times each year. Thus, in September 1957, with North Korea's "International Trade Promotion Committee," Japan concluded trade agreements 6 million pounds, valid for one year.

In August 1965, Nitcho Trade Committee agreed on general terms concerning trade transactions, and promoted trade

with North Korea. Together with Chosoren organizations, and "Asahi Export-Import Company," the Nitcho Trade Committee played the role of front guard to promote and protect North Korea's business activities in Japan.

4. The Nitcho Friendship Promotion Committee Association (Nitcho Friendship Association). Upon returning from a visit to North Korea on August 19, 1971, Yufuku Akamatsu, Vice-Committee Chairman of the Japanese Socialist Party, announced a plan to form a goodwill association with the cooperation of non-partisan congressmen and the North Korean government. An initiation meeting was held on October 14, 1971 at which the goals of the Nitcho Friendship Association were to promote: (1) goodwill between North Korea and Japan, and (2) understanding of the Koreans who desire unification of their homeland. After a preparatory general conference on November 15, 1971, an organizational general assembly was held the next day. Using the office of Tsunehiko Yasutaku (a Socialist Party Dietman) as its base, Nitcho Friendship Association retained a total of five members. These five members were: (1) Chuji Hisano (Liberal-Democratic Party), as committee chairman pro tempore; (2) Tokkaku Ashii (Socialist Party), Kyo Moji (Democratic Socialist Party), Yasuyuki Okimoto ('Komeito' Party), Zentaro Taniguchi (Communist Party), and Kazuhiko Nozue (Independent), all four members as vice-committee chairman. Besides these members were a standing committee of eleven directors, twenty directors, and six supervisors. The register of the entire membership was not open to the public. According to the announcement made by the Nitcho Friendship Association, the

total number of members was 240, divided as follows: (1) Liberal-Democratic Party, 31; (2) Socialist Party, 155 (entire members); (3) Democratic Socialist Party, 15; (4) Communist Party, 24 (entire members; and (5) Independent Party, 6.

The Nitcho Friendship Association promoted the exchange of economic, cultural, artistic and athletic representatives and science and technology. Further, it was known to have promoted the Chosoren's repatriation program, free travel to North Korea and a guarantee of re-entry visa to Japan, the protection of racial rights, and the unification of the Korean peninsula.

On January 16, 1972, thirteen members from the House of Representatives and two others were dispatched to North Korea as representatives of the Japanese government and signed the "document of consent for the promotion of trade between North Korea and Japan." In this manner the Nitcho Friendship Association became a pressure group to achieve the political goals of the North Korean government in Japan, and thus expanded its organization down to the district level.

5. The Others. Aside from the organizations described, there are other pro-North Korea groups such as the Nitcho Joint Committee for Science and Technology; The Round Table Committee concerned with the Racial Education for Koreans in Japan; the Joint Committee concerned with the Racial Education for Koreans in Japan; the Joint Committee for Repatriation of Koreans in Japan; and the Committee for the Promotion and Exchange of Arts and Science between North Korea and Japan. Under the active support and guidance of the Chosoren, these

organizations carried out the anti-South Korea activities of the North Korean government. These activities were ascertained by the Japanese Public Security Commission. On September 5, 1974, to the question raised by Dietman Shintaro Ishihara (Liberal-Democratic Party), "Is it not considered appropriate to acknowledge South Korea's allegation that Japan has become the base for North Korean government's anti-South Korea operation?" Mr. Sanda, the Secretary of Japanese Police, replied that, "From 1950 to the present, there have been 34 incidences of underground espionage activity and 57 North Korean underground operation workers have been arrested. It became evident that the majority of them were engaged in the anti-South Korea operations."[91]

Thus, through various Chosoren affiliated organizations in Japan, the activities of Korean residents affect the Japanese government on a political level.

In economy, these organizations made a significant contribution to North Korea. (See Chapter V.)

V. ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS

A. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMY

When the normalization of relations with Japan was established in 1965, a number of KBA (Korean Businessmen's Association) businessmen, who were prominent in the South Korean economy and were participating in the five-year economic plan, saw great business opportunities in the prospect of some $800 million of Japanese capital that would be brought into South Korea. The prospect of better Japanese relations thus provided them an opportunity for shifting the orientation of their businesses from the poor domestic market to the exploration of richer foreign markets, with the help of Japanese capital, technology, and market skills. These Korean businessmen were also hopeful that Japan would liberalize its tariff and eliminate other restrictions on the importance of Korean products in order to improve South Korea's balance of trade.[92]

In Japan, those businessmen who promoted an early conclusion of the South Korea-Japan negotiations were a group of powerful capitalists known as the "Korea lobby," in alliance with the pro-South Korea faction of conservative politicians. Most of them belonged to the so-called Kansai Zaibatsu, and among them were the fifteen top capitalists in Japan, who financed the key factional bosses in the Liberal Democratic Party.[93]

The pro-South Korean lobbyists were led, among politicians, by Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Minister of Justice Ishii

Mitsujiro and Vice-President of the Liberal Democratic Party Ono Bankoku.[94]

Their formal organization was the South Korea-Japan Economic Cooperation Organization, the Federation of Economic Organizations, and the Japan Federation of Employers Associations. The primary political organization of the pro-South Korean group was the "consultative study for the South Korea-Japan Problem" in the Liberal Democratic Party.[95]

Between 1962 and 1965, Japanese economic survey missions, including leading figures of industry and finance, visited South Korea to explore opportunities for Japanese investments there. South Korea promised to be ideal in view of the geographical and cultural affinity. Furthermore, the expanding investments of the United States, West Germany, France, and Italy in South Korea, in conjunction with the five-year economic plan, caused Japanese businessmen to fear that they would be eliminated from the Korean market unless diplomatic relations were established soon. Thus, economic cooperation, which would involve an estimated $800 million worth of products and services after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, was the prime concern of the pro-South Korean Japanese lobbyists.[96]

It is clear that considerable pressure was exerted by the capitalists of both countries, especially those of Japan, on their governments and that this pressure was one of the decisive factors in bringing the South Korea-Japan negotiations to an early conclusion. Japanese intellectuals and leftists called the South Korea-Japan rappproachment "monopolistic capitalists'

aggression against South Korea," "exploitation of the South Korean market and cheap labor," and even "oppression of the Japanese workers by using the surplus labor of the South Korean at low wages." South Koreans who opposed the South Korea-Japan Treaty used similar terms, but in a different context, describing the treaty as economic aggression by Japan.[97]

The Foreign Capital Induction Plan of South Korea was established to carry out the second five-year plan. Foreign capital investment began to increase from 1967, and it reached $1 billion by 1972.[98]

The rapid growth in the South Korean economy was due mainly to the expansion of the export industry, with foreign capital investment undoubtedly contributing much to the growth. In 1970, the South Korean government constructed the free export district in Masan and, in 1973, constructed a plant for the electronics industry in Kumi, the birthplace of President Pak Chung-hee, in South Korea.[99] The majority of the enterprises which penetrated South Korean industry were made possible by Japanese capital investment. Japanese capital poured into South Korea from Korean residents in Japan. The investment made by the Korean residents came from those who qualified themselves under the Article II of the Foreign Capital Induction Plan, i.e., "those Koreans who maintained Korean citizenship and continuously lived abroad more than 10 years are eligible for such investment."[100] Therefore, almost the entire amount of the investment made by the Korean residents flowed into Korean industry as Japanese capital.

One such major investment made by Korean residents was the Pang-nim Textile Company, established with a capital investment of 1,500,000,000 Won. Another was the Yun-sung Textile Company, which was built with a capital investment of 1,200,000,000 Won in Kumi.[101] Of the 201 Korean export industrial enterprises which are scattered between Seoul and Inchon, twenty-seven of them were set up with investments made by Korean residents of Japan. On the other hand, there were only eleven enterprises were set up by other foreigners. It is further estimated that the seventy-seven joint capital investment enterprises included some capital from Korean residents of Japan. The vested interests held by the Korean residents are included in the Japanese investment, and therefore, it is difficult to distinguish them separately. For example, in the case of the Korean Television Corporation, it appears as 100 percent Japanese capital investment; however, it is 80 percent Toshiba, and the other 20 percent belongs to Korean residents in Japan. With Korean Electronics Corporation, the Toshiba-Korean residents ratio is 70-30.[102]

Thus, in the Japanese capital investments in Korea, there are three types of investments.

1. It is 100 percent Japanese capital investment both in reality and formality;
2. It is 100 percent Japanese investment in formality; however, in reality, it is a joint investment between the Japanese and the Korean residents;
3. It is a joint investment between the Japanese and the Korean residents in both reality and formality;

4. Further, in reality, it may be 100 percent South Korean investment; however, since it includes the investment made by the Korean residents of Japan, on the surface, it is considered a joint investment.

These Japanese investment firms continue to help strengthen South Korean economy which has shown a remarkable growth in recent years.

B. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY

1. Trade Agreements

The initial trade between North Korea and Japan began in June 1956 when representatives from four Japanese trade firms visited North Korea to conclude an agreement to open the trade between the two countries, to be carried out via Dairen, Manchuria. In Pyongyang in September 1957, the Nitcho (Japan-North Korea) Trade Agreement was formally concluded between the North Korean International Trade Promotion Committee and three Japanese trade firms. However, within one year, by September 1958, the Nitcho Trade Agreement was invalidated. Later, in May 1959 "The Nitcho Direct Trade General Assembly" was held in Tokyo by the Nitcho trade members to reopen the North Korea-Japan trade. In April 1961, the Japanese government approved direct import-export trade with North Korea. In February 1963, general agreement was reached concerning trade items between the Japanese and North Korean trade firms. In September 1963 a contract was concluded between the Mitsui Bank and the North Korean Trade Banks. Up to 1963, the trade volume between the two countries was: $8,999,000 in 1961; $9,300,000 in 1962; and did not exceed a billion dollars. However, in 1963 the

trade volume reached $14,800,000 for the first time. In 1964 the trade volume jumped to $31,500,000--twice that of the previous year. From 1965 to 1967 the total trade volume remained at about $40,000,000, and during the period from 1968 to 1971, due to an increase in Japanese exports, the trade volume was increased to $50,000,000. Again in 1972 the total value of trade jumped to $132,000,000 and $100,000,000.

From 1956 to 1971, the trend of Nitcho trade was on the increase, and the year 1972 observed an even greater increase. However, due to North Korea's unfavorable foreign exchange record, which began to surface from mid-1974, the trade volume began to fall. In 1976 monthly exports with North Korea were between $6 to $8 million. From 1975 to the middle of 1976, imports from North Korea remained at $5 million per months, which meant that the trade represented a mere one fifth of the total trade of the peak period.

2. Significance of the Nitcho Trade

a. Significance to Japan. Although the Japanese government has approved the export insurance, it is entirely free of any control over Nitcho trade. Most of the trade firms participating in the trade are small and middle-sized companies in Japan. Nitcho trade in Japan is a private enterprise. The entire Nitcho trade amount, even during the peak period, represented only 0.31 percent of the entire Japanese trade volume and, therefore, to the Japanese economic sector North Korea is not such an an attractive market. Thus, Japan could literally do with or without Nitcho trade. However, because of the Japanese government's foreign policies which

were based on continued friendly relations with all nations in the world, North Korea-Japan trade continued even though there were no active diplomatic relations between the two countries.

In the private sector Nitcho trade is considered purely economic, without political overtones. Since trade with China was dominated by the big companies in Japan, most companies participating in Nitcho trade were small and middle-sized, venturing into communist countries. Therefore, for Japan, the significance of Nitcho trade is the opportunity for middle-sized companies to earn outside of Japan.

b. Significance to North Korea. Generally, the communist countries' trade and economic exchanges with the Western world are not purely economic; rather, they have strong political implications. The primary purpose is to earn foreign currencies which provide the funds needed for the Communist Revolution. Another purpose is the exchange of personalities from political circles. Therefore, the purpose lies beyond the mere exchange of trade itself.

Through Nitcho trade, North Korea is able to penetrate Japanese political and economic circles. Some of the items exported to North Korea such as gliders, rubber boats, and diving suits, which were shippped under "Maritime Accident Rescue Use," have been utilized for the military in North Korea. When the tunnel which was dug by the North Korean workers was discovered by the South Korean government, there were Japanese radios among the items left behind in the tunnel. Almost all of the rubber boats used by the North Korean guerrilla force

penetrating into South Korea through the sea route, were Japanese products.

The Nitcho trade proves a far greater boon to North Korea than to Japan, not only in the economic sector but also in the political and military fields. Judging by the North Korean government's inability to pay off the trade balance on time, North Korea-Japan trade does not carry much significance to Japan.[103]

3. North Korea's Unpaid Debts to Japan

Concerning the unpaid trade debts owed by North Korea to Japan in the amount of $250 million, the Nitcho Trade Association urgently invited 50 representatives from the banks and related companies to seek a final solution. On July 28, 1976, the Asahi and the Mainichi newspapers reported the solution as follows:

(1) The Terms of the Payment.

(a) The Long Term Debts: Payments due for the 1975-78 period would be extended for two years.

(b) The Short Term Debts: Extensions will not be granted. However, when a settlement cannot be made before a deadline, the settlement for a given year should be made in the following year.

(2) The Interest Rate.

(a) The Long Term Debts: The prime rate for long term debts in 1976 was 9.25% plus 1.25% handling charges.

(b) The Short Term Debts: Payments due in 1974 were at a rate of 11.5%, those due in August 1975 were paid at 9.5%, after September 1975, the BA rate (Bank Note Receipt

Rate) plus 3.25% in handling charges, became the accepted interest rate of 8.75%.

(3) The Payment Method.

(a) Interest payments in arrears should be paid promptly, and the Japanese government will give notice every three months of overdue interest payments.

(b) Early remittances can be requested from the North Korean government should there be any special problems resulting in the Japanese companies' need for such payments.

(4) The Goods Waiting to be Shipped.

(a) The remittances should be made promptly, and only the goods specified in the contract should be received.

(5) The Payment Guarantees.

(a) If possible, obtain written guarantees from the governmental organizations, and establish definite repayment schedules.

(b) Concerning the above (a), the following plans were submitted by Mr. Sokawa, the general manager of the Nitcho Trade Association, when he visited North Korean in June 1976:

(i) The Interest Rate: When it involves the extension of the two year fixed term, the interest rate would be 7.5%. When using the international interest market price, according to the world custom, the prevailing London market price of the Deutsch Mark for the preceding six month period, plus the handling charge of 1.25% would be used as the standard. The Japanese government would have an option of choosing one of the preceding two alternatives.

(ii) The extension of the loan payment for two years would apply only to the loans which would become due by 1978; however, the payments which were to have been settled by 1975 should be extended for two and a half years. Concerning the North Korean government's loan repayment to Japan, as it was mentioned above, there was a big gap between the two countries, and thus the Japanese government had begun an investigation concerning the debt problem. According to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Japan's total outstanding loan balance to North Korea was reported to have been $240 million as of August 1976. Of the $250 million, the amount overdue was $60 million.

According to the statistics compiled by the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO), North Korea's total trade loan balance was over $1.8 billion. Of this amount, $700 million represented loans obtained from the Soviet Union. It was apparent, therefore, that so long as there was no assistance from the Soviet Union, a breakthrough in the deteriorating economic condition would not be possible.

On June 4, 1979, Japanese trade sources announced that a three member North Korean Mission would visit Japan in mid-June to confer with Japanese officials on North Korea's $80 billion outstanding debts. The sources said North Korea would ask again for deferment of payment of its outstanding trade accounts in the consultation with Japan. North Korea's large outstanding accounts in trade with Japan first became an issue around 1974 because of North Korea's serious shortage of foreign exchange.[104]

The major causes for the deteriorating economic conditions in North Korea were: (1) The national energy was directed to the Defense Industry which could not be expanded; (2) Due to the six-year plan and the modernization process, the machinery and the plants were overworked; (3) The prevailing unfavorable international market for Zinc, which had been the major export item; (4) After 1972, the period which was originally aimed toward the expansion of trade with the West, there occurred instead a major swing towards the purchase of petroleum.

North Korea was aiming for a self-supporting economy and, therefore, began producing industrial machinery of its own. In the machine industry it was superior to South Korea but the cost of production was higher than imported machinery. These were the major causes for the deterioration of the economic situation in North Korea. North Korea was manufacturing machinery while ignoring the high production costs, and these factories could not be readily transformed to munitions production.

Although there were no direct capital investments made in North Korea by Korean residents, the North Korea-Japan trade played a vital role in maintaining the mutual ties between Japan and North Korea without the formal establishment of diplomatic relations. Further, the Japan-North Korean trade had some of the implications in the North Korean economy mentioned below.

1. North Korea's Refusal to Renew Visas for Japanese Businessmen. On August 31, 1976, according to the announcement made by the Nitcho Trade Association and the Japanese governmental

agencies, the North Korean government refused to extend visas for Japanese businessmen who were visiting North Korea and demanded their immediate return to Japan. There were approximately ten individuals who were refused an extension of visas, and of these some were businessmen and some were technicians from the Hidate Shipbuilding Company. Along with denial of visa extension, the North Korean government, through the Nitcho Export-Import Trade Association, requested that the seven business firms which were anticipating a goodwill visit to North Korea postpone their visit until further notice. North Korea, however, did not specify its reasons. The denials of visa extensions was limited to only a few businessmen and technicians, and thus approximately 80 technicians working in the cement plant were allowed to stay in North Korea. However, the postponement of the goodwill visit to North Korea by Japanese businessmen was not limited only to Nitcho trade relations. In early September 1976, the Central Chosoren Committee announced the cancellation of its forthcoming visit to Pyongyang by the representative groups in Japan to commemorate the 28th anniversary of the founding of the North Korean government on September 9, 1976. These steps were taken by North Korea after the Panmunjom incident of August 18, 1976.

2. The Shin-Nichi Testsu (New Japan Iron) Company halts Iron Ore Import from North Korea. Since 1963, North Korea has exported iron ore from the Moosan Mine in North Korea to the Shin-Nichi Iron Company in Japan. In 1976 the Shin-Nichi Iron Company was notified by North Korean that the export price of iron ore would go up more than 50 percent. The Shin-Nichi Iron

Company decided to discontinue its importation of iron ores for 1976. According to the Nitcho Trade Association, during the 1970-75 five-year period, the Shin-Nichi Iron Company imported 400 thousand tons of iron ore from the Moosan Mine totaling $96.7 billion in value. The price increase of more than 50 percent was not acceptable to the Shin-Nichi Iron Company. Meanwhile, future plans for the importation of iron ore from North Korea remained unclear.

The loss of the Japanese market became more crucial to North Korea when trade was discontinued between North Korea and Western Europe. On August 29, 1976, England, Germany, and France discontinued their trade with North Korea by applying for export insurance through the Nitcho Trade Association. In Sweden it was reported that even after expiration of the first moratorium, which ended in June 1976, the North Korean government's overdue payments remained unpaid.

The transactions for the Nitcho Trade Association during the 1976-77 period are show in Tables XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII.

4. The Total Transactions for the Nitcho Trade Association in 1976

The total value of the Nitcho Trade Association's transactions to pass through customs in 1976 amounted to 285,700,042,000 Yen. Imports were 212,430,401,000 Yen, and total trade amounted to 498,130,443,000 Yen. Compared to the total trade for the Nitcho Trade Association in 1975, exports decreased by half, whereas imports increased by ten percent. During the same period, the excess of exports from Japan was 75 Billion Yen, compared to 41.8 Billion Yen and 34 Billion Yen for 1974 and 1975, respectively.

In comparison to the volume of trade between the Socialist countries and Japan, trade between North Korea and Japan for 1976 was the seventh highest, ranking behind the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Poland, Cuba, Vietnam, and Rumania (It ranked fifth in 1975.). The total value of transactions were as follows:

TABLE XXVI

THE NITCHO TRADE ASSOCIATION'S TRANSACTIONS
TO PASS THROUGH CUSTOMS
(Unit: 1,000 Yen)

Year	Japan's Exports	Japan's Imports	Total
1961	1,777,810	1,431,259	3,209.069
1962	1,721,082	1,639,250	3,360,332
1963	1,925,063	3,394,893	5,319,956
1964	4,062,106	7,283,226	11,345,332
1965	5,941,902	5,300,300	11,242,202
1966	1,805,810	8,169,123	9,974,933
1967	2,293,164	10,658,020	12,951,184
1968	7,469,185	12,251,420	19,720,605
1969	8,697,208	11,586,920	20,284,128
1970	8,403,798	12,389,169	20,792,967
1971	10,025,357	10,542,791	20,568,148
1972	28,780,569	11,799,811	40,580,380
1973	27,072,887	19,607,139	46,680,026
1974	73,516,042	31,695,229	105,211,271
1975	53,331,814	19,283,273	72,615,087
1976	29,570,042	21,243,401	49,813,443

TABLE XXVII

VALUE OF TRADE BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND JAPAN FOR 1976
(Unit: 1,000 Yen)

Country	Japan's Exports	Japan's Imports	Total
Soviet Union	667,521,797	346,287,434	1,013,809,231
PRC	496,599,310	406,549,339	903,148,649
Poland	75,265,443	22,870,303	98,135,746
Cuba	59,528,182	14,899,193	74,427,375
Vietnam	49,588,526	14,516,300	64,104,826
Rumania	39,588,006	13,838,355	53,427,361
North Korea	28,570,042	21,243,401	49,813,443
Yugoslavia	28,407,845	4,425,192	32,833,037
East Germany	14,489,161	4,066,623	18,555,784
Bulgaria	13,991,277	4,541,915	18,533,192
Czechoslovakia	8,873,548	9,172,684	18,046,232
Hungary	9,953,930	3,597,903	13,551,833
Albania	694,563	162,628	857,191
Mongolia	137,773	126,158	263,931
TOTAL	1,493,209,403	866,298,428	1,359,507,831

Source: The Study of the North Korean Economy, April 1977, p. 35.

The total value of the Nitcho Trade Association's transactions passing through customs for the first quarter of 1977 came to 7,980,360,000 Yen in imports (This figure is 87.3 percent of the 1976 amount for the same quarter.), 5,190,578,000 Yen in imports (13.85 percent of the amount for the same period in 1976), and total value of trade amounted to 13,173,000,947,000 Yen (only 10.21 percent of the volume for the same period in 1976).

The main export items for the first quarter, 1977, were as follows:

TABLE XXVIII

THE MAIN EXPORT ITEMS
FIRST QUARTER, 1977
(Unit: 1,000 Yen)

	Items	Unit	Quantity	Amount	%
1.	Weedkiller	KG	885,000	589,120	7.4
2.	Transmitters and Tranceivers (Ultra Short Wavelength)	KO	387	544,324	6.8
3.	Unwoven Cloth	KG	219,441	529,399	6.6
4.	Printing Papers	KG	1,967,974	272,365	3.4
5.	Corks and Half-Finished Corks	MT	8,765	221,365	2.8
6.	Lead	MT	1,864	205,114	2.6
7.	Synthetic Fibers (Tire Cords and Polyamide Fibers)	KG	297,054	192,577	2.4
8.	Aluminum Wares and Accessories	MT	65	188,905	2.4
9.	Synthetic Fabrics (Polyester Fabrics, Over 85%)	KG	65,894	187,857	2.3
10.	Craft Papers and Boards	KG	1,784,915	179,687	2.3
11.	Nickel Ore	MT	100	151,183	1.9
12.	Synthetic Fabrics (Polyamide Fabrics, over 85%)	KG	56,923	134,562	1.7
13.	Lubricating Oil	KL	1,294	128,574	1.6
14.	Crossbar Style Telephone Switch Machine	NO	2	123,833	1.6
15.	Textured Thread (Polyamide Fibers)	KG	85,515	112,411	1.4
16.	Phthalic Acid	KG	700,000	110,418	1.4
17.	Polyester Short Fibers	KG	349,900	106,073	1.3
18.	Glycelyn	KG	350,000	105,115	1.3
19.	Machinery for the Food Industry Use (and Others)	NO	7	102,509	1.3
20.	Other Machinery	NO	117	98,024	1.2
	TOTAL			4,283,415	53.7
	Others			3,699,954	46.3
	Total Exports			7,983,369	100.0

Source: The Study of the North Korean Economy, June 7, 1977, p. 37.

Separately, the Korean residents of Japan sent contributions to help build the North Korean economy as specified below.

5. Economic Contributions to North Korea by the Korean Residents of Japan

Unlike the capital investments in the South Korean economy by the Korean residents of Japan, funds in the form of contributions were sent to North Korea to help set up various plants and factories over a period of time.

In 1973 the Aeguk Textile Company was set up with a gift fund sent by the Korean residents of Japan in the amount of 500 million Yen. The machinery used in this factory[105] was manufactured by the Ohkuma Corporation in Japan. Another textile company, the Kangso Aeguk Textile Company, was set up in the Sohak mountain region in Kangso, Pyongan-Namdo. This three-story building was donated by the Daito Ueno Branch and the Edogawa Branch in Tokyo.[106] The third factory, the Namhung Grain Factory, which is engaged in extracting oil from grain, was also established by funds sent by the Korean residents of Japan.[107] The fourth factory, the Pyongyang Aeguk Noodle Factory, was a gift to commemorate Kim Il-sung's 65th birthday.[108] On August 14, 1979 Pyongyang Octane Factory began operations. This factory is engaged in the production of Octane using corn as raw material.[109]

Thus, since 1956 when the initial trade between Japan and North Korea began, Korean residents of Japan helped to support the North Korean economy by sending contributions to further its growth.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The year 1979 marks the 34th year since the Korean people regained their freedom from Japan. More than six decades have passed since the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. The Japanese government enslaved the Korean people, robbed them of their land, and even tried to eliminate their culture. Beginning in the 1920's and continuing until the end of World War II, many Koreans migrated to Japan seeking their livelihood. There were also other groups of Koreans who were sent to Japan as laborers or were drafted by the Japanese colonial government.

Since most of these Korean emigrants, with the exception of students and draftees, were illiterate or semi-illiterate, they were employed mostly in low-paying jobs, and thus held the lowest socio-economic status in Japanese society. Accordingly, Korean immigrants in Japan were often criticized for their foreign manners and conduct, and became targets for ridicule and humiliation by the Japanese. After World War II, of the 2.5 million Koreans remaining in Japan, the majority were repatriated to their homeland, leaving approximately 600,000 Korean residents.

The Korean group in Japan is divided factionally. The Mindan, the pro-South Korean faction has support from the Liberal Democratic Party, which maintains close economic and political ties with the Pak Chung-hee regime. The Chosoren, the pro-North Korea faction, maintains its loyalty to the

the Kim Il-sung regime and actively propagates the 'Chuche' ideology to the Korean residents in Japan.

From the sociological point of view, the ethnic consciousness and cohesiveness of the Korean residents of Japan is very strong. They maintain their national identity, form their organizations, and send their children to Korean schools. Since the first-generation Koreans migrated to Japan in the 1920's, by the 1950-60 period there were a larger number of second-generation Koreans in Japan. During the 1950-60 period, with the cooperation of the Japanese government, an attempt was made to establish a greater mutual understanding between the two groups: Japanese society and the Korean residents. An example is the exchange program set up by Japanese education authorities to encourage Japanese students to study in Korean schools in Japan. Thus, a greater understanding of the two cultures was emphasized. Consequently, a degree of assimilation among the second-generationKorean youths began to take place. Those Koreans who were assimilated into Japanese society, especially those who intermarried, had somewhat improved opportunities in securing employment, job advancements, and degree of acceptance by the Japanese. For the third-generation Korean youths, the future holds an opportunity for a yet greater degree of assimilation. It remains to be seen, however, whether such assimilation is desirable.

The South Korea-Japan Treaty of 1965 granted permanent resident status to Korean residents who entered Japan prior to August 16, 1945. The treaty provided a livelihood, social welfare, and health benefits to the Korean residents. Although

the legal status of Korean residents in Japan was established with the normalization of relations between South Korea and Japan, the inconsistency of the Japanese government's treatment of Korean residents brought disadvantages to the Koreans. Hence, the scope of their economic activities is still very limited. The majority of the Korean residents hold such speculative jobs as running entertainment facilities and restaurants. They are also generally employed in the Mindan or Shosoren-operated organizations and, in comparison to their Japanese counterparts, receive much lower salaries. Although they command pay equivalent to that of the Japanese in the professional and technical fields, such opportunities are quite limited to the Korean residents.

Korean residents must pay 10-20 percent more in taxes than the Japanese. This is because there are no provisions made for some of the legal organizations or industries to qualify Korean residents for tax exemptions, and the majority of the Korean residents hold occupations which place them within the more heavily taxed categories. Consequently, despite the phenomenal growth in the Japanese economy, little favorable change in the livelihood of the Korean residents has taken place. The economic situation of Korean residents in Japan did not improve much after the South Korea-Japan Treaty of 1965.

The idea of a unified homeland remains very strong in the minds of many Koreans living in Japan. They envision a day when the entire Korean peninsula will have been unified under one government. However, as long as these Koreans are involved

in a conflict between the communist and the non-communist world, the solution to their problems hinges upon international relations in Asia. Their future will be more closely connected with global relations to the great powers than with the political developments between the two Koreas and Japan.

No. 8471. TREATY[1] ON BASIC RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. SIGNED AT TOKYO, ON 22 JUNE 1965

Japan and the Republic of Korea,

Considering the historical background of relationship between their peoples and their mutual desire for good neighborliness and for the normalization of their relations on the basis of the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty ;

Recognizing the importance of their close cooperation in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations to the promotion of their mutual welfare and common interests and to the maintenance of international peace and security ; and

Recalling the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951[2] and the Resolution 195 (III) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 12, 1948 ;[3]

Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty on Basic Relations and have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries.

Japan :

Etsusaburo Shiina, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

Shinichi Takasugi

The Republic of Korea :

Tong Won Lee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea

Dong Jo Kim, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Korea

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles :

[1] Came into force on 18 December 1965, the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification at Seoul, in accordance with article VII.

[2] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 136, p. 45.

[3] United Nations, *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, Resolutions* (A/810), p. 25.

Article I

Diplomatic and consular relations shall be established between the High Contracting Parties. The High Contracting Parties shall exchange diplomatic envoys with the Ambassadorial rank without delay. The High Contracting Parties will also establish consulates at locations to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

Article II

It is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void.

Article III

It is confirmed that the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea as specified in the Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly.

Article IV

(*a*) The High Contracting Parties will be guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in their mutual relations.

(*b*) The High Contracting Parties will cooperate in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in promoting their mutual welfare and common interests.

Article V

The High Contracting Parties will enter into negotiations at the earliest practicable date for the conclusion of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis.

Article VI

The High Contracting Parties will enter into negotiations at the earliest practicable date for the conclusion of an agreement relating to civil air transport.

Article VII

The present Treaty shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Seoul as soon as possible. The present Treaty shall enter into force as from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE in duplicate at Tokyo, this twenty-second day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five in the Japanese, Korean, and English languages, each text being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

For Japan :

Etsusaburo SHIINA
Shinichi TAKASUGI

For the Republic of Korea :

TONG WON LEE
DONG JO KIM

No. 8474

JAPAN
and
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Agreement on the legal status and treatment of nationals of the Republic of Korea residing in Japan (with agreed minutes and record of discussions). Signed at Tokyo, on 22 June 1965

Official texts: Japanese and Korean.

Registered by Japan on 15 December 1966.

JAPON
et
RÉPUBLIQUE DE CORÉE

Accord relatif au statut juridique et au traitement des ressortissants de la République de Corée résidant au Japon (avec procès-verbal approuvé et procès-verbal des discussions). Signé à Tokyo, le 22 juin 1965

Textes officiels japonais et coréen.

Enregistré par le Japon le 15 décembre 1966.

[TRANSLATION[1]—TRADUCTION[2]]

No. 8474. AGREEMENT[3] ON THE LEGAL STATUS AND THE TREATMENT OF THE NATIONALS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA RESIDING IN JAPAN BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. SIGNED AT TOKYO, ON 22 JUNE 1965

Japan and the Republic of Korea,

Considering that nationals of the Republic of Korea residing in Japan for many years have come to have special relations with Japanese society; and

Recognizing that enabling these nationals of the Republic of Korea to lead a stabilized life under the social order of Japan will contribute to the promotion of friendly relations between the two countries and their peoples;

Have agreed as follows :

Article I

1. The Government of Japan shall give permission for permanent residence in Japan to a national of the Republic of Korea falling under either of the following categories, if he applies for such permission within five years from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement in accordance with the procedure to be established by the Government of Japan for the implementation of the present Agreement :

(*a*) A person residing in Japan since August 15, 1945, or a date prior thereto, continuously until the time of his application; or

(*b*) A person born in Japan on or after August 16, 1945 and before the period of five years from the date of the entry into force of the present Agree-

[1] Translation by the Government of Japan. The Secretariat also received an English translation of this agreement from the Government of the Republic of Korea which on certain points differs from that provided by the Government of Japan. At the request of the Government of the Republic of Korea, these differences have been shown by printing in italics the pertinent word of phrase in the translation of the Government of Japan and providing in square brackets the corresponding expression in the translation by the Government of the Republic of Korea.

[2] Traduction du Gouvernement japonais. Le Gouvernement de la République de Corée a également communiqué au Secrétariat une traduction anglaise de cet accord qui diffère en certains points de celle transmise par le Gouvernement japonais. À la demande du Gouvernement de la République de Corée, on a indiqué en italique dans la traduction transmise par le Gouvernement japonais chaque mot ou groupe de mots donnant lieu à divergence et introduit à la suite entre crochets l'expression correspondante dans la traduction fournie par le Gouvernement de la République de Corée.

[3] Came into force on 17 January 1966, the thirtieth day following the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which took place at Seoul on 18 December 1965, in accordance with article VI.

ment expires, as a lineal descendant of a person falling under (*a*) above, and residing in Japan continuously until the time of his application.

2. The Government of Japan shall give permission for permanent residence in Japan to a national of the Republic of Korea who is born in Japan after the lapse of five years from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement as a child of a person who is given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 above, if such child applies for such permission within sixty days from the date of birth in accordance with the procedure to be established by the Government of Japan for the implementation of the present Agreement.

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 above, the application period for permission for permanent residence shall be sixty days from the date of birth in the case of a person who falls under paragraph 1 (*b*) above and is born after the lapse of four years and ten months from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement.

4. No fee shall be levied for the above-mentioned applications and permissions.

Article II

1. With respect to the residence in Japan of the nationals of the Republic of Korea born in Japan as lineal descendants of the persons who are given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I, the Government of Japan agrees, if requested by the Government of the Republic of Korea, to holding consultations *until twenty-five years will have elapsed* [by the lapse of twenty-five years] from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement.

2. In the consultations under the preceding paragraph, the spirit and purposes which form the basis of the present Agreement shall be respected.

Article III

A national of the Republic of Korea who is given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I shall not be deported from Japan unless he comes to fall under any of the following categories by his *act* [acts] committed on or after the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement:

(*a*) A person who, for crimes concerning insurrection or crimes concerning foreign aggression, is sentenced in Japan to imprisonment or to a heavier punishment (except a person who is granted the suspension of execution of such sentence or who is sentenced for reasons of responding to an agitation or following the lead of another in an insurrection);

(*b*) A person who, for crimes concerning foreign relations, is sentenced in Japan to imprisonment or to a heavier punishment, or a person who, for his criminal acts committed against the head of a foreign state, a diplomatic envoy or his official premises, is sentenced to imprisonment or to a heavier punishment and thereby prejudice vital interests of Japan in its foreign relations;

(*c*) A person who, by violating the laws and regulations in Japan concerning control of narcotics with profitmaking intents, is sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment for life or for not less than three years (except a person who is granted the suspension of execution of such sentence), or a person who, by violating the laws and regulations in Japan concerning control of narcotics, is sentenced to penalties not less than three times (twice in the case of a person who was sentenced to penalties not less than three times by his acts committed prior to the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement); or

(*d*) A person who, by violating the laws and regulations in Japan, is sentenced to penal servitude or to imprisonment for life or for more than seven years.

Article IV

The Government of Japan shall pay due consideration to the following matters :

(*a*) Matters concerning education, livelihood protection and national health insurance in Japan for the nationals of the Republic of Korea who are given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I; and

(*b*) Matters concerning taking property with them and remitting funds to the Republic of Korea in the event that nationals of the Republic of Korea, who are given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I (including persons who are qualified to apply for permission for permanent residence in accordance with the provisions of the said Article), renounce their intention of residing permanently in Japan and return to the Republic of Korea.

Article V

It is confirmed that, with regard to all matters, including entry into and exit from Japan and residence in Japan, the nationals of the Republic of Korea who are given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I shall be subject, unless specifically provided for in the

present Agreement, to the laws and regulations in Japan applicable equally to all aliens.

Article VI

The present Agreement shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Seoul as soon as possible. The present Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Tokyo, in the Japanese and Korean languages, both being equally authentic, this twenty-second day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five.

For Japan :

Etsusaburo SHIINA

Shinichi TAKASUGI

For the Republic of Korea :

TONG WON LEE

DONG JO KIM

AGREED MINUTES TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE LEGAL STATUS AND THE TREATMENT OF THE NATIONALS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA RESIDING IN JAPAN BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The representatives of the Governments of Japan and the Republic of Korea have reached the following understandings concerning the Agreement on the Legal Status and the Treatment of the Nationals of the Republic of Korea Residing in Japan between Japan and the Republic of Korea signed today :

Re *Article I* :

1. For the purpose of certifying that a person who applies for permission for permanent residence in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 or 2 of the Article has the nationality of the Republic of Korea

(i) Such person shall produce his passport or a certificate in lieu thereof, or shall submit a written statement that he has the nationality of the Republic of Korea; and

(ii) The competent authorities of the Government of the Republic of Korea will reply in writing in case the competent authorities of the Government of Japan make inquiries in writing.

2. For the purposes of paragraph 1 (*b*) of the Article, " a person falling under (*a*) " *will* [shall] include a national of the Republic of Korea residing in Japan since August 15, 1945 or a date prior thereto, continuously until the time of his death.

Re *Article III* :

1. For the purposes of (*b*) of the Article, " his official premises " are the buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used as embassy or legation (including the residence of the diplomatic envoy).

2. The Government of Japan *will* [shall], when it intends to deport a person falling under (*c*) or (*d*) of the Article, take into consideration the composition of his family and other circumstances from a humanitarian standpoint.

3. The Government of the Republic of Korea *will, in accordance with* [shall, at the request of] the request of the Government of Japan, co-operate in accepting a person who is to be deported from Japan under the provisions of the Article.

4. It is the policy of the Government of Japan that, when deportation procedures are taken with respect to a person qualified to apply for permission for permanent residence in accordance with the provisions of Article I of the Agreement, it will, taking into account that should he be given permission for permanent residence he shall not be deported from Japan unless he falls under either of (*a*) through (*d*) of Article III, withhold the enforcement of his deportation :

(i) in case he has already applied for permission for permanent residence, until decision is given on his application; or

(ii) in case he has not applied for permission for permanent residence, until whether or not he intends to apply is confirmed, and in case he applies, until decision is given on his application.

Re *Article IV* :

1. In accordance with the laws and regulations, the Government of Japan *will* [shall], when nationals of the Republic of Korea who are given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I of the Agreement wish to enter a public primary or secondary school of Japan, take such measures as it deems necessary so that such entrace may be permitted, and *will* [shall], when they finish a secondary school of Japan, recognize their qualification for applying for higher schools of Japan.

2. The Government of Japan *will* [shall] have for the time being the present livelihood protection for the nationals of the Republic of Korea who are given permission for permanent residence in accordance with the provisions of Article I of the Agreement continued.

3. The Government of Japan *will* [shall] take such measures as it deems necessary in order to insure under the National Health Insurance the nationals of the Republic of Korea who are given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I of the Agreement.

4. When the nationals of the Republic of Korea who are given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I of the Agreement (including persons who are qualified to apply for permission for permanent residence) renounce their intention of residing permanently in Japan and return to the Republic of Korea, the Government of Japan *will* [shall] permit in principle that they may take all their property with them or remit all their funds.

For this purpose :

(i) with respect to their taking their property with them, the Government of Japan *will* [shall], within the scope of the laws and regulations, permit their taking with them their personal effects, household goods and professional tools and equipments, and pay due consideration as much as possible in authorizing their exportation; and

(ii) with respect to their taking with them or remitting their funds, the Government of Japan *will* [shall], within the scope of the laws and regulations, permit their taking with them or remitting their funds not exceeding ten thousand United States dollars per family at the time of their returning home, and their taking with them or remitting the exceeding amount as the case may be.

Tokyo, June 22, 1965

E. S.

T. W. L.

RECORD OF DISCUSSIONS

In the course of the negotiations for conclusion of the Agreement on the Legal Status and the Treatment of Korean Nationals residing in Japan, the following statements were made respectively by the Japanese and Korean sides :

Japanese Representative :

(*a*) In the application of the provisions of paragraph 1 (*a*) of Article I of the Agreement, it is the policy of the Government of Japan to regard the period between the departure from Japan for military service or for compulsory labour recruitment and the arrival in Japan under the repatriation programme as the period of continued residence in Japan.

(*b*) The following will be included among those which a person applying for permission for permanent residence in accordance with the provisions of Article I of the Agreement is to submit or produce :

(i) Application for permission for permanent residence

(ii) Photograph

(iii) Statement on family relations and residence record in Japan

(iv) Certificate of alien registration.

(*c*) The term " such measures as it deems necessary " referred to in paragraph 1 of the part of the Agreed Minutes to the Agreement regarding Article IV of the Agreement means guidance, advice and recommendation given by the Ministry of Education in accordance with the laws and regulations presently in force.

(*d*) The term " such measures as it deems necessary " in paragraph 3 of the part of the Agreed Minutes to the Agreement regarding Article IV of the Agreement includes amendment of the ordinance of the Ministry of Welfare. However, since a preparatory period of considerable length will be necessary for taking such measures, the Government of Japan will ensure that those Korean nationals will be insured under the National Health Insurance as from the first day of the fiscal year following the fiscal year to which the first day after the lapse of one year from the date of the entry into force of the Agreement belongs.

(*e*) The Republic of Korea is designated in the notification under the Cabinet Order concerning the Acquisition of Properties by Aliens as a country to which the said Order shall not apply, and the Government of Japan has no intention to delete it upon the entry into force of the Agreement.

(*f*) It is the policy of the Government of Japan that, when a national of the Republic of Korea who is given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I of the Agreement intends to leave Japan and applies for re-enty permission, it will, within the scope of the laws and regulations, handle such application as favourably as possible.

Korean Representative :

(*a*) It is the policy of the Government of the Republic of Korea that, after the entry into force of the Agreement, it will co-operate with the Government of

Japan in accepting nationals of the Republic of Korea to be deported from Japan under the laws and regulations of Japan concerning immigration control.

(*b*) The Government of the Republic of Korea, while recognizing that a preparatory period of considerable length will be necessary for taking " such measures as it deems necessary " referred to in paragraph 3 of the part of the Agreed Minutes to the Agreement regarding Article IV of the Agreement, expects that such measures will be taken as soon as possible.

(*c*) The Government of the Republic of Korea is prepared to consider with the Government of Japan measures for co-operating with the latter to the extent possible at the latter's request in order to stabilize the life of the nationals of the Republic of Korea residing in Japan and relieve the poor among them.

M. Y.
K. H. L.

FOOTNOTES

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[2]Chae-il Park, The Overall Study of Koreans in Japan (Tokyo, Japan: Shin Kigen-sha), p. 38.

[3]Kim, Ibid., p. 35.

[4]Richard H. Mitchell, The Korean Minority in Japan (University of California Press, 1967), p. 15.

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[6]Park, Ibid., p. 36.

[7]Mitchell, Ibid., p. 28.

[8]Kim, Ibid., p. 38.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid.

[12]U.S. Area Handbook for Japan (Department of the Army, 1961), p. 80.

[13]E. W. Wagner, The Korean Minority in Japan, pp. 20-21.

[14]Area Handbook for Japan (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1974), p. 70.

[15]Chung-ang Shinmun, March 5, 1976.

[16]U.S. Military Government Statistics, May 20, 1946.

[17]Kwan-bond Kim, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (New York: Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs, 1971), p. 65.

[18]Ok-nyol Kim, Hanguk Kwa Mi-Il Kwan-gye Non (Korea and the U.S.-Japan Relations, Seoul, Korea: Il Cho Kak, 1974), p. 29.

[19]Mitchell, Ibid., p. 104.

[20]Kwan-bong Kim, Ibid., p. 65.

[21]Edward W. Wagner, The Korean Minority in Japan (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), p. 43.

[22]Mitchell, Ibid., p. 104.

[23]Asahi Nenkan, (Asahi Shimbum Sha, 1972), p. 302.

[24]The Dispersed Families in Korea (The Republic of Korea National Red Cross, Seoul, 1977), p. 171.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Ibid., p. 172.

[27]Ibid.

[28]W. D. Reeve, The Republic of Korea: A Political and Economic Study (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 59.

[29]The Dispersed Families in Korea, Ibid., p. 173.

[30]Ibid., p. 174.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Chung-ang Il-bo, March 1, 1976.

[34]Area Handbook for Japan (1974), Ibid., p. 79.

[35]Ibid., p. 70.

[36]Asahi Nenkan, Ibid., p. 524.

[37]The Dispersed Families in Korea, Ibid., p. 110.

[38]Ibid.

[39]Mitchell, Ibid., p. 121.

[40]Kwan-bong Kim, Ibid., p. 69.

[41]Mitchell, Ibid., p. 122.

[42]JPRS-Far East (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 5 January 1979), No. 641, pp. 41-42.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Area Handbook for North Korea (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1976), p. 129.

[45]The Tenth Chosoren Conference (The Public Safety Investigation Section, Tokyo, Jpan, May 1974), pp. 32-34.

[46]Mitchell, Ibid., p. 120.

[47]Kwan-bong Kim, Ibid., p. 69.

[48]Mitchell, Ibid., p. 126.

[49]The Tenth Chosoren Conference, Ibid., pp. 32-34.

[50]New York Times, August 15, 1965.

[51]Ok-nyol Kim, Ibid., p. 130.

[52]Kwan-bong Kim, Ibid., p. 40.

[53]Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yearbook of the Republic of Korea Diplomacy with Important Documents, Seoul, 1966, pp. 324-25.

[54]White Paper on the ROK-Japan Talks, (Government of the ROK, Seoul), 1965, pp. 190-91.

[55]Ibid., p. 191.

[56]Kwan-bong Kim, Ibid., p. 41.

[57]Ibid.

[58]Ibid., p. 42.

[59]ROK, Taehanminguk Kongbocho (Office of Public Information of the Republic of Korea), "Speech Concerning the ROK-Japan Trade, October 22, 1958," in Taetongryong yi sungkan paksa tamhwa jip (Collection of the Speeches of the President, Dr. Syngman Rhee), Vol. for Economic, Diplomatic, Military, Cultural, and Social Affairs, Pusan, 1952), p. 2.

[60]Chosun Ilbo, February 18, 1965.

[61]Ok-nyol Kim, Ibid., p. 131.

[62]Ibid.

[63]Ibid.

[64]Mitchell, Ibid., p. 119.

[65]Kwan-bong Kim, Ibid., p. 66.

[66]Ibid.

[67]Hanil hoedam paekso (White Paper on the ROK-Japan Talks), p. 190.

[68]Ok-nyol Kim, Ibid., p. 59.

[69]See the testimony of Yu Chin-o, in Kukhoe hoeuirok (Proceedings of the National Assembly), 49th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 9, February 21, 1964), pp. 16-17.

[70]Kwan-bong Kim, Ibid., p. 67.

[71]Ibid.

[72]Ok-nyol Kim, Ibid., p. 137.

[73]Ibid., p. 59.

[74]Kwan-bong Kim, Ibid., p. 68.

[75]See the statement of Ishii Mitsujiro, in Shugiin kaigiroku (Proceedings of the House of Representatives), 50th Session, Special Committee on Japan-ROK, No. 7, October 30, 1965), p. 6.

[76]"The ROK-Japan Talks," Hanguk soshik (News for Korea), supplementary issue for the ROK-Japan Talks, April 21, 1965, p. 10.

[77]Kwan-bong Kim, op. cit., p. 68.

[78]The Dispersed Families in Korea, Ibid., p. 112.

[79]Ibid.

[80]Ibid.

[81]Ibid., p. 113.

[82]Ibid.

[83]Joon, Jeon, A Study of Chosoren II, Korea University Press, Seoul, Korea, 1972, p. 161.

[84]Ibid.

[85]Ibid.

[86]Ibid., p. 163.

[87]Ibid.

[88]Ibid.

[89]Ibid.

[90]Ibid.

[91]Ibid., p. 178.

[92]Kwan-bong Kim, Ibid., p. 87.

[93]Ibid., p. 88.

[94]Ibid.

[95]Ibid.

[96]Ibid., p. 89.

[97]Ibid., p. 90.

[98]Mikio, Sumiya, Kankoku No Keizai (The Korean Economy), Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, Japan, April 1974, p. 123.

[99]Ibid., p. 124.

[100]Ibid.

[101]Ibid.

[102]Ibid.

[103]A Study of North Korea, The Nitcho Trade Relations, November 1976, No. 30, p. 40.; April 1977, #35, p. 30; June/July 1977, #37, p. 36.

[104]The Japan Times Weekly, Saturday, June 9, 1979, p. 2.

[105]KNS (Choson Tongshin), April 10, 1975, p. 7., NODONG, May 1, 1976.

[106]Choguk Magazine, June 1973, p. 22., NODONG, November 17, 1976.

[107]KNS, February 21, 1979.

[108]KNS, September 21, 1978.

[109]KNS, April 19, 1979, p. 7.

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